Author

Felipe Molina

Risk

[

Security Risk Low

]

0day-ID

0day-ID-21748

Category

web applications

Date add

14-01-2014

CVE

CVE-2013-7204

Platform

hardware

Affected Product: Conceptronic camera CIPCAMPTIWL
Tested Firmware: 21.37.2.49
Tested Web UI Firmware: 0.61.4.18
Assigned CVE: CVE-2013-7204
CVSSv2 Base Score: 5.8 (AV:N/AC:M/AU:N/C:P/I:P/A:N)
Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Request Forgery [CWE-352]
Solution Status: Not Fixed
Vendor Notification Timeline:
    - 23/12/2013: Contacting with technical support through their web
form http://www.conceptronic.net/supcon.php?action=init
    - 23/12/2013: Contacting with general information email addres
(info@conceptronic.net) to inform about the vulnerability and request
suitable security or technical contact to send the complete details of
the CSRF.
    - 25/12/2013: Contacting with public twitter accounts
@conceptronic and @conceptronic_es to request suitable security or
technical contact to send the complete details of the CSRF.
    - 28/12/2013: Recontacting the technical support.
    - 28/12/2013: Recontacting general information address
info@conceptronic.net.
    - 02/01/2014: Trying to conntact with security@conceptronic.net y
vulnerabilities@conceptronic.net but they are non existent addresses.
    - 03/01/2014: Involve Inteco CERT in the notification proccess.
    - 08/01/2014: Inteco confirms that there is still no response from
Conceptronic.
 
None of the comunication atempts with the vendor received a response,
so I'm publishing the advisory to warn users and confirm the
vulnerability with you.
 
**Vulnerabilitty details**
 
The CSRF is present in the CGI formulary used to create and modify
users of the web interface of the camera (/set_users.cgi). This CSRF
would allow a malicious attacker to create users in the camera web
interface (including administrator users) if he is able to lure the
legitimate administrator of the camera to visit a web controlled by
the attacker.
 
An example of the process to exploit this vulnerability:
 
1- A webcam administrator is already logged in the camera web interface.
 
2- A malicious user knows it and send a link to this administrator
pointing to a web controlled by this attacker
(http://example.com/conceptronic_csrf.html). In this web, the attacker
placed an image with the following code:
 
  <img alt="csrf image"
src="http://<victim_camera_server>/set_users.cgi?next_url=rebootme.htm&user1=attacker&pwd1=attacker&pri1=2&user2=&pwd2=&pri2=0&user3=&pwd3=&pri3=0&user4=&pwd4=&pri4=0&user5=&pwd5=&pri5=0&user6=&pwd6=&pri6=0&user7=&pwd7=&pri7=0&user8=&pwd8=&pri8=0">
 
3- The webcam administrator visit the link.
 
4- The page http://example.com/test_csrf.html tries to load the image
by making a GET request to the pointed URL, thus, making the
legitimate administrator to create a new user identified by "attacker"
and password "attacker".
 
A video was uploaded to youtube showing this behaviour:
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=URXEe_VRc74
 
This issue can be fixed by adding an additional step to the user
creation CGI, either requesting the administrator password again
before creating/modifying any user or creating a hidden random token
for each form (https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)
 
-- 
Felipe Molina de la Torre

#  0day.today [2024-11-16]  #