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DrayTek VigorACS SI 1.3.0 - Multiple Vulnerabilities
DrayTek VigorACS SI ( <= 1.3.0) Vigor ACS-SI Edition is a Central Management System for DrayTek routers and firewalls, providing System Integrators or system administration personnel a real-time integrated monitoring, configuration and management platform. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 2.1. Default http-auth username/password used for <ip>/ACSServer/* We found that most of the VigorACS SI deployments are using the default http authentication settings (acs/password). This is not so much a software vulnerability but more a configuration issue. 2.2 Unauthenticated arbitrary file read/write functionality via UploadDownloadServlet The UploadDownloadServlet can be used to (read and) write files to the server directly. In addition, this functionality is accessible without having to provide the http authentication details (2.1). 2.3. Path traversal and Local File Inclusion in the FileServlet The regular expression that is used to prevent this is not sufficient: it removes occurences of '../' (without the quotes). By providing input like '....//', the middle '../' will be removed, while the remainder equals to '../'. We could now use the FileServlet to access any file on the server: <ip>/ACSServer/FileServlet?f=....//....//....//....//....//....//....//etc/passwd 2.4. Arbitrary file upload in <ip>/ACSServer/UploadFileServlet This servlet suffers from the same path traversal vulnerability as described in 2.2. You can POST data to this servlet to upload files into arbitrary locations: http://<ip>//ACSServer/UploadFileServlet?prefix=<URLENCODED('a&....//....//....//....//....//server/default/deploy/web.war/shell.jsp&a&a&a&a')> The UploadFileServlet will append '.cfg' to the given filename, this means files uploaded via this mechanism aren't directly of use by an attacker. However, when the payload is a ZIP archive, the vuln. in 2.5 (Local unzip functionality) can be used to unpack an otherwise benign file into an full-blown remote web-shell. 2.5. Local unzip functionality The RPC server provides an unzip functionality (rpcmanager.UnZip) that can be invoked by using the AMF message broker (accessible via http://<ip>/ACSServer/messagebroker/amf). This functionality can be used to unzip any file on the file system like one that has been previously uploaded using the UploadFileServlet vuln. 2.6. ACS runs as root The webservice is running as the root user. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Timetable: 2014-09-26 : Vender released patches (private and unverified) to their customers 2014-07-22 : Vendor states that most of the vulns. are patched 2014-07-08 : Vendor notified customers with large deployments 2014-06-30 : Response of Vendor 2014-06-24 : Notified Vendor # 0day.today [2024-09-20] #