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Thomson Reuters Fixed Assets CS <=13.1.4 - Privileges Escalation Exploit
# Exploit Title: Thomson Reuters Fixed Assets CS <=13.1.4 Local Privilege Escalation/Code Execution # Date: 12/1/14 # Exploit Author: singularitysec@gmail.com # Vendor Homepage: https://cs.thomsonreuters.com # Version: Fixed Assets CS <=13.1.4 Local Privilege Escalation/Code Execution # Tested on: Windows XP -> Windows 7, Windows 8 # CVE : 2014-9141 Product Affected: Fixed Assets CS <=13.1.4 (Workstation Install) Note: 2003/2008 Terminal Services/Published apps **may** be vulnerable, depending on system configuration. This vulnerability has been reference checked against multiple installs. This configuration was identical across all systems and each version encountered. Executables/Services: C:\WinCSI\Tools\connectbgdl.exe Attack Detail: The Fixed Assets CS installer places a system startup item at C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup Which then executes the utility at C:\WinCSI\Tools\connectbgdl.exe. The executables that are installed, by default, allow AUTHENTICATED USERS to modify, replace or alter the file. This would allow an attacker to inject their code or replace the executable and have it run in the context of an authenticated user. An attacker can use this to escalate privileges to the highest privileged level of user to sign on to the system. This would require them to stop the vulnerable executable or reboot the system. The executable appears to only allow on instance to be executed at a time by default, the attacker would need to restart or kill the process. These are the default settings for this process. This could compromise a machine on which it was installed, giving the process/attacker access to the machine in question or execute code as that user. An attacker can replace the file or append code to the executable, reboot the system or kill the process and it would then compromise the machine when a higher privileged user (administrator) logged in. This affects workstation builds. It may be possible on legacy servers/published application platforms but this was not tested. Remediation: Remove the modify/write permissions on the executables to allow only privileged users to alter the files. Apply vendor patch when distributed. Vulnerability Discovered: 11/27/2014 Vendor Notified: 12/1/2014 # 0day.today [2024-12-26] #