0day.today - Biggest Exploit Database in the World.
Things you should know about 0day.today:
Administration of this site uses the official contacts. Beware of impostors!
- We use one main domain: http://0day.today
- Most of the materials is completely FREE
- If you want to purchase the exploit / get V.I.P. access or pay for any other service,
you need to buy or earn GOLD
Administration of this site uses the official contacts. Beware of impostors!
We DO NOT use Telegram or any messengers / social networks!
Please, beware of scammers!
Please, beware of scammers!
- Read the [ agreement ]
- Read the [ Submit ] rules
- Visit the [ faq ] page
- [ Register ] profile
- Get [ GOLD ]
- If you want to [ sell ]
- If you want to [ buy ]
- If you lost [ Account ]
- Any questions [ admin@0day.today ]
- Authorisation page
- Registration page
- Restore account page
- FAQ page
- Contacts page
- Publishing rules
- Agreement page
Mail:
Facebook:
Twitter:
Telegram:
We DO NOT use Telegram or any messengers / social networks!
You can contact us by:
Mail:
Facebook:
Twitter:
Telegram:
We DO NOT use Telegram or any messengers / social networks!
OSSEC 2.7 <= 2.8.1 - Local Root Escalation Vulnerability
Author
Risk
[
Security Risk High
]0day-ID
Category
Date add
CVE
Platform
Fix for CVE-2015-3222 which allows for root escalation via syscheck - https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/releases/tag/2.8.2 Affected versions: 2.7 - 2.8.1 Beginning is OSSEC 2.7 (d88cf1c9) a feature was added to syscheck, which is the daemon that monitors file changes on a system, called "report_changes". This feature is only available on *NIX systems. It's purpose is to help determine what about a file has changed. The logic to do accomplish this is as follows which can be found in src/syscheck/seechanges.c: 252 /* Run diff */ 253 date_of_change = File_DateofChange(old_location); 254 snprintf(diff_cmd, 2048, "diff \"%s\" \"%s\"> \"%s/local/%s/diff.%d\" " 255 "2>/dev/null", 256 tmp_location, old_location, 257 DIFF_DIR_PATH, filename + 1, (int)date_of_change); 258 if (system(diff_cmd) != 256) { 259 merror("%s: ERROR: Unable to run diff for %s", 260 ARGV0, filename); 261 return (NULL); 262 } Above, on line 258, the system() call is used to shell out to the system's "diff" command. The raw filename is passed in as an argument which presents an attacker with the possibility to run arbitrary code. Since the syscheck daemon runs as the root user so it can inspect any file on the system for changes, any code run using this vulnerability will also be run as the root user. An example attack might be creating a file called "foo-$(touch bar)" which should create another file "bar". Again, this vulnerability exists only on *NIX systems and is contingent on the following criteria: 1. A vulnerable version is in use. 2. The OSSEC agent is configured to use syscheck to monitor the file system for changes. 3. The list of directories monitored by syscheck includes those writable by underprivileged users. 4. The "report_changes" option is enabled for any of those directories. The fix for this is to create temporary trusted file names that symlink back to the original files before calling system() and running the system's "diff" command. # 0day.today [2025-01-06] #