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libxml2 - xmlParseEndTag2 Heap Based Buffer Overread
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=638 The following crash due to a heap-based out-of-bounds memory read can be observed in an ASAN build of latest stable libxml2 (2.9.3, released 4 days ago), by feeding a malformed file to xmllint ("$ ./xmllint /path/to/file"): --- cut --- ==4588==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6290000049e6 at pc 0x00000062b643 bp 0x7ffffa00f570 sp 0x7ffffa00f568 READ of size 1 at 0x6290000049e6 thread T0 #0 0x62b642 in xmlParseEndTag2 libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:9828:13 #1 0x61d620 in xmlParseElement libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:10238:2 #2 0x618dac in xmlParseContent libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:10042:6 #3 0x61cc7c in xmlParseElement libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:10215:5 #4 0x618dac in xmlParseContent libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:10042:6 #5 0x61cc7c in xmlParseElement libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:10215:5 #6 0x63be9b in xmlParseDocument libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:10912:2 #7 0x672b74 in xmlDoRead libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:15390:5 #8 0x673041 in xmlReadFile libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:15452:13 #9 0x4f5b60 in parseAndPrintFile libxml2-2.9.3/xmllint.c:2401:9 #10 0x4ebe8f in main libxml2-2.9.3/xmllint.c:3759:7 0x6290000049e6 is located 2018 bytes to the right of 16388-byte region [0x629000000200,0x629000004204) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4b8ef0 in realloc llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:61 #1 0xa079a5 in xmlBufGrowInternal libxml2-2.9.3/buf.c:486:23 #2 0xa06722 in xmlBufGrow libxml2-2.9.3/buf.c:515:11 #3 0x72fef4 in xmlParserInputBufferGrow libxml2-2.9.3/xmlIO.c:3326:9 #4 0x543b22 in xmlParserInputGrow libxml2-2.9.3/parserInternals.c:320:8 #5 0x569d10 in xmlGROW libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:2081:5 #6 0x68208d in xmlParseNCNameComplex libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:3499:6 #7 0x68136d in xmlParseNCName libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:3591:12 #8 0x67d282 in xmlParseQName libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:8859:9 #9 0x61f04d in xmlParseStartTag2 libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:9381:17 #10 0x61a626 in xmlParseElement libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:10129:16 #11 0x618dac in xmlParseContent libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:10042:6 #12 0x61cc7c in xmlParseElement libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:10215:5 #13 0x618dac in xmlParseContent libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:10042:6 #14 0x61cc7c in xmlParseElement libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:10215:5 #15 0x63be9b in xmlParseDocument libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:10912:2 #16 0x672b74 in xmlDoRead libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:15390:5 #17 0x673041 in xmlReadFile libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:15452:13 #18 0x4f5b60 in parseAndPrintFile libxml2-2.9.3/xmllint.c:2401:9 #19 0x4ebe8f in main libxml2-2.9.3/xmllint.c:3759:7 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow libxml2-2.9.3/parser.c:9828:13 in xmlParseEndTag2 Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c527fff88e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c527fff88f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c527fff8900: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c527fff8910: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c527fff8920: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x0c527fff8930: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa]fa fa fa 0x0c527fff8940: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c527fff8950: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c527fff8960: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c527fff8970: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c527fff8980: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Heap right redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack partial redzone: f4 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==4588==ABORTING --- cut --- The crash was reported at https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=758589. Attached is an XML file which triggers the crash. Proof of Concept: https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39492.zip # 0day.today [2024-12-24] #